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UNITED NATIONS

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UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS PAST AND PRESENT

UNTSO
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
June 1948 - To present

UNMOGIP
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
January 1949 - To present

UNEF I
First United Nations Emergency Force
November 1956 - June 1967

UNOGIL
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
June 1958 - December 1958

ONUC
United Nations Operation in the Congo
July 1960 - June 1964

UNSF
United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)
October 1962 - April 1963

UNYOM
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
July 1963 - September 1964

UNFICYP
United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus
March 1964 - To present

DOMREP
Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic
May 1965 - October 1966

UNIPOM
United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
September 1965 - March 1966

UNEF II
Second United Nations Emergency Force
October 1973 - July 1979

UNDOF
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
June 1974 - To present

UNIFIL
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
March 1978 - To present

UNGOMAP
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
April 1988 - March 1990

UNIIMOG
United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
August 1988 - February 1991

UNAVEM
United Nations Angola Verification Mission
January 1989 - June 1991

UNTAG
United Nations Transition Assistance Group
April 1989 - March 1990

ONUCA
United Nations Observer Group in Central America
November 1989 - January 1992

UNIKOM
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
April 1991 - To present

UNAVEM II
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
June 1991 - To present

ONUSAL
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
July 1991 - To present

MINURSO
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
September 1991 - To present

UNAMIC
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
October 1991 - March 1992

UNPROFOR
United Nations Protection Force
March 1992 - To present

UNTAC
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
March 1992 - To present

UNOSOM
United Nations Operation in Somalia
April 1992 - To present

ONUMOZ
United Nations Operation in Mozambique
December 1992 - To present

UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

HEADQUARTERS: Government House, Jerusalem

DURATION: June 1948 - to date

STRENGTH: Currently 240 military observers, reducing to 224 by July 1993

FATALITIES: 28

CHIEF OF STAFF: Major-General Krishna Narayan Singh Thapa (Nepal)

BACKGROUND

From its early days, the United Nations has been concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. Since 1948, there have been five full-fledged wars directly connected with the conflict, and five United Nations peace-keeping operations have been established in the region. Of these, three are still deployed.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has its origins in the problem of Palestine, which was brought before the United Nations early in 1947. At the time, Palestine was a Territory administered by the United Kingdom under a Mandate from the League of Nations, with a population of about 2 million, two thirds of whom were Arabs and one third, Jews.

In November 1947, the General Assembly endorsed a plan for the partition of the Territory, providing for the creation of an Arab State and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem to be placed under international status. The plan was not accepted by the Palestinian Arabs and Arab States.

On 14 May 1948, the United Kingdom relinquished its Mandate over Palestine and the State of Israel was proclaimed. On the following day, the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by Arab States, opened hostilities against Israel.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNTSO

On 29 May, the Security Council, in its resolution 50 (1948), called for a cessation of hostilities in Palestine and decided that the truce should be supervised by the United Nations Mediator, with the assistance of a group of military observers. This resolution formed the basis for the establishment of the first United Nations peace-keeping operation which became known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The first group of observers arrived in the region between 11 and 14 June 1948 and were immediately deployed in Palestine and some of the Arab countries.

UNTSO'S OPERATIONS

While UNTSO was initially used in supervising the original truce of 1948, its function was radically altered in 1949 with the conclusion of four General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the four neighbouring Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria). Its main responsibility then was to assist the parties in supervising the application and observance of those Agreements. Its headquarters was established at Government House in Jerusalem, where it remains today.

Following the 1967 war, UNTSO established two cease-fire observation operations, in the Israel-Syria sector and in the Suez Canal zone. In 1972, a similar operation was set up in southern Lebanon. When United Nations peace-keeping forces were later deployed, in the Sinai in 1973, on the Golan Heights in 1974 and in southern Lebanon in 1978, UNTSO observers were attached to the new forces to assist them in their operations.

Today, UNTSO observers continue to be assigned to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights in the Israel-Syria sector. They man eleven observation posts located in the area of separation maintained by the Force and in the vicinity of the lines on both sides. They also conduct the fortnightly inspections of the areas of limitation in armaments and forces provided for under the disengagement agreement of 1974. This group of UNTSO

observers is formed into Observer Group Golan (OGG). The Observer Detachment Damascus (ODD), a separate UNTSO unit, serves UNTSO in Syria and performs support functions for OGG.

In the Israel-Lebanon sector, UNTSO observers who have been detailed to assist the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) form the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL). This Group, which is under operational control of the UNIFIL commander, maintains five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Armistice Demarcation Line and operates five mobile teams in parts of the UNIFIL area of operation that are under Israeli control and where UNIFIL infantry units are not deployed.

UNTSO continues to maintain its presence in the Egypt-Israel sector, where its observers are organized as Observer Group Egypt (OGE). The Group has its headquarters in Ismailia, operates outposts in the Sinai and conducts patrols in most parts of the peninsula. OGE maintains liaison for UNTSO with the Egyptian authorities.

In addition, UNTSO maintains offices in Amman, Beirut and Gaza.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Over the years, UNTSO has also made available its personnel to assist in the setting up of other United Nations peace-keeping operations not connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The rapid deployment of experienced United Nations observers has been most valuable in setting up the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963, the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) and the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) in 1988, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in 1991, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 1992 and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) also in 1992.

COMPOSITION

UNTSO's military observers come from 19 contributing countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland and United States.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

Since its establishment in 1948, UNTSO has been financed from the regular budget of the United Nations. Its costs are therefore assessed as part of each biennial programme budget. The annual cost of the operation is approximately $31 million.

UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE

LOCATION: Syrian Golan Heights

HEADQUARTERS: Damascus

DURATION: June 1974 - to date

CURRENT STRENGTH: 1,130 troops assisted by the military observers of UNTSO's Observer Group Golan

FATALITIES: 31

FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Roman Misztal (Poland)

BACKGROUND

On 6 October 1973, war erupted again in the Middle East between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Suez Canal area and the Sinai and between Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights. On 24 October, as fighting between Egypt and Israel reached a critical stage, the Security Council decided to set up a second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). The Force was immediately moved into place between the Israeli and Egyptian armies in the Suez Canal area, and its arrival effectively stabilized the situation.

In the Israel-Syria sector tension remained high, and from March 1974 the situation became increasingly unstable. Against this background, the United States undertook a diplomatic initiative, which resulted in the conclusion of an Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces. The Agreement provided for an area of separation and for two equal zones of limited forces and armaments on both sides of the area, and called for the establishment of a United Nations observer force to supervise its implementation. The Agreement was signed on 31 May 1974.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNDOF

Later on the same day, the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974) by which it set up the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). As provided in the Agreement on Disengagement, UNDOF's mandate was to maintain the cease-fire between Israel and Syria, to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces, and to supervise the areas of separation and limitation. Since then, the Security Council has periodically extended UNDOF's mandate for periods of six months at a time.

UNDOF'S ACTIVITIES

Advance parties of the Force arrived in the area on 3 June 1974 and within two weeks its total strength was brought to near its then authorized level of about 1,250. Following the completion of the disengagement operation and the delineation of the lines bounding the area of separation, UNDOF set up a series of check-points and observation posts within that area. In addition, two base camps were established, one on the east side of the area of separation and the other on the west side.

In the area of separation UNDOF operates static positions and observation posts, which are manned 24 hours a day, and conducts patrols by vehicle or on foot along predetermined routes by day and night. Temporary outposts and additional patrols are set up from time to time to perform specific tasks.

Under a programme undertaken by the Syrian authorities, civilians have continued to return to the area of separation, the population of which has doubled since the establishment of UNDOF. The Syrian Arab Republic has stationed police in the area of separation in exercise of its administrative responsibility. UNDOF has adjusted its operations accordingly to take account of these developments and to continue to carry out effectively its supervisory tasks under the Agreement on Disengagement.

UNDOF headquarters maintains close liaison with the Israeli and the Syrian authorities through their senior

military representatives. At the local level, the commanders of the UNDOF units maintain liaison with one side or the other through liaison officers designated by the parties.

UNDOF conducts fortnightly inspections of armament and force levels in the area of limitation. These inspections are carried out with the assistance of liaison officers from the parties, who accompany the inspection teams. The findings of the inspection teams are communicated to the two parties. The inspections have generally proceeded smoothly with the cooperation of the parties concerned, although on both sides restrictions are regularly placed on the movement of the teams in some localities.

UNDOF has performed its tasks effectively, with the cooperation of the parties, and the area has remained generally quiet.

HUMANITARIAN FUNCTIONS

In addition to its normal peace-keeping functions, UNDOF has carried out activities of a humanitarian nature. At the request of the parties, UNDOF has from time to time exercised its good offices in arranging for the transfer of released prisoners and the bodies of war dead between Israel and Syria. It has assisted the International Committee of the Red Cross by providing it with facilities for the hand-over of prisoners and bodies, for the exchange of parcels and mail and for the passage of persons and personal effects across the area of separation. Within the means available, UNDOF has also provided medical treatment to the local population.

COMPOSITION

UNDOF was originally composed of Austrian and Peruvian infantry units and Canadian and Polish logistic elements transferred from the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). The Peruvian contingent was withdrawn in July 1975 and replaced by an Iranian contingent. This contingent was in turn withdrawn in March 1979 and replaced by a Finnish contingent. Currently, UNDOF is composed of contingents from Austria, Canada, Finland and Poland, as well as a number of military observers, detailed from UNTSO. In addition, UNTSO observers assigned to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission assist UNDOF in the execution of its tasks.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

From its inception, UNDOF has been financed from the special account established for UNEF II. Following the termination of UNEF II in July 1979, the account remained open for UNDOF. The annual cost to the United Nations of the operation is approximately $36 million. As at 31 January 1993, total contributions outstanding to the Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation to 31 May 1993 amounted to approximately $33 million.

UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

LOCATION: Southern Lebanon

HEADQUARTERS: Naqoura

DURATION: March 1978 - to date

STRENGTH: Some 5,250 troops assisted by 57 military observers of UNTSO's Observer Group Lebanon, and approximately 520 international and local civilian staff

FATALITIES: 190

FORCE COMMANDER: Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren (Sweden)
(General Wahlgren is succeeded by Major-General Trond Furuhovde of Norway, with effect from 23 February 1993)

BACKGROUND

In the early 1970s, tension along the Israeli-Lebanon border increased, especially after the relocation of Palestinian armed elements from Jordan to Lebanon. Palestinian commando operations against Israel and Israeli reprisals against Palestinian bases in Lebanon intensified. On 11 March 1978, a commando attack in Israel resulted in many dead and wounded among the Israeli population; the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) claimed responsibility for that raid. In response, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon on the night of 14/15 March, and in a few days occupied the entire southern part of the country except for the city of Tyre and its surrounding area.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIFIL

On 15 March, the Lebanese Government submitted a strong protest to the Security Council against the Israeli invasion, stating that it had no connection with the Palestinian commando operation. On 19 March, the Security Council adopted resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), in which it called upon Israel immediately to cease its military action and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory. It also decided to establish immediately a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon for an initial period of six months, subject to extension. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was set up with the mandate to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. The first UNIFIL troops arrived in the area on 23 March 1978.

UNIFIL'S ACTIVITIES

Until now, however, it has not yet been possible for UNIFIL to carry out in full its original mandate. From its inception, the Force had to operate under extremely difficult conditions. The PLO and the Government of Israel never fully accepted the UNIFIL mandate with all its implications. Given these attitudes, the Force was prevented from deploying fully in the area evacuated by the Israeli forces between April and June 1978. In fact, the enclave along the border was turned over to the "de facto forces" (Christian and associated militias supported and supplied by Israel). Israel, thus, retained a degree of military power in the area and continued its fight against the PLO and its Lebanese allies. UNIFIL's efforts to implement its mandate in these conditions inevitably met with only partial success and caused the Force to suffer significant casualties.

In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon again. This invasion changed UNIFIL's situation drastically. For three years, UNIFIL in its entirety remained behind the Israel lines, with its role limited to providing protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population to the extent possible.

In 1985, Israel carried out a partial withdrawal but it retained control of an area in southern Lebanon, manned by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and by Lebanese de facto forces (DFF), the so-called "South Lebanon Army". IDF/DFF remain targets for attacks by

armed groups opposed to the occupation. For their part, IDF/DFF react vigorously to these attacks, often with heavy weapons and with air support from Israel.

UNIFIL has thus been prevented from carrying out its mandate. In the circumstances, it endeavours, to the best of its ability, to prevent its area of operations from being used for hostile activities and to protect civilians caught in the conflict.

UNIFIL's operations are based on a network of positions which are manned 24 hours a day. The Force maintains 45 checkpoints, whose function is to control movement on the principal roads in UNIFIL's area; 95 observation posts, whose function is to observe movement on and off the roads; and 29 checkpoints/observation posts which combine the functions of control and observation. Each is assigned responsibility for ensuring that hostile activities are not undertaken from the area surrounding it. This involves not only keeping watch from the position but also patrolling by foot or vehicle in its vicinity. In addition, unarmed military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) man five observation posts and operate five mobile teams in the area under Israeli control. The UNTSO observers are under the operational control of UNIFIL's Commander.

UNIFIL's network of positions and the patrols mounted from them also play a central role in the Force's performance of its humanitarian task. They provide the civilian population with protection and with a source of help if they are subjected to harassment. Within available resources, UNIFIL also provides civilians with medical supplies, water, food, fuel, electricity, engineering work and escort for farmers. UNIFIL medical centres and mobile teams have provided care to an average of 2,000 civilian patients per month and a field dental programme has also been provided.

In accordance with its mandate of assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the UNIFIL area, UNIFIL and the Lebanese military authorities worked out arrangements for the transfer to the Lebanese army of responsibility for the western part of the Force's Ghanaian battalion sector. The hand-over, which involved the vacating of eight UNIFIL positions, was completed in early April 1992.

In January 1993, in his report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that although UNIFIL had not been able to make progress towards the implementation of its mandate, its contribution to stability in the region and the protection it provided to the local population remained nevertheless important. He recommended to extend UNIFIL's mandate for a further period of six months, that is until 31 July 1993. The Security Council approved this recommendation.

COMPOSITION OF UNIFIL

In the course of 1992, the strength of UNIFIL was reduced by 10 per cent. At present, UNIFIL has some 5,250 troops provided by Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Norway, Poland and Sweden. In addition, 57 military observers from UNTSO's Observer Group Lebanon assist the Force in the performance of its tasks. UNIFIL employs 524 civilian staff, of whom 155 are recruited internationally.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The annual cost to the United Nations of UNIFIL is approximately $146 million. The costs of the operation are met by the assessed contributions of the United Nations Member States. As at 31 January 1993, total contributions outstanding to the UNIFIL Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation to 31 January 1993 amounted to approximately $210 million.

UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

LOCATION: The cease-fire line between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir

HEADQUARTERS: Rawalpindi (November-April), Srinagar (May-October)

DURATION: January 1949 - to date

STRENGTH: 38 military observers

FATALITIES: 6

CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER: General Ricardo Jorge Galarza-Chans (Uruguay)

BACKGROUND

For nearly four decades, the United Nations has been concerned with the conflict between India and Pakistan over the status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In August 1947, India and Pakistan became independent. Under the scheme of partition provided by the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir was free to accede to India or Pakistan. Its accession to India became a matter of dispute between the two countries and fighting broke out later that year.

The question first came before the Security Council in January 1948, when India complained that tribesmen and others, with Pakistan's support and participation, were invading Kashmir and extensive fighting was taking place. Pakistan denied the charges and declared that Kashmir's accession to India was illegal.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNMOGIP

On 20 January, the Security Council adopted resolution 39 (1948) establishing a three-member United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and mediate the dispute. On 21 April 1948, by its resolution 47 (1948), the Council decided to enlarge the membership of UNCIP and recommended various measures, including the use of observers, to stop the fighting. The cease-fire between India and Pakistan came into effect on 1 January 1949, and a first group of UN military observers arrived in the area on 24 January. On 18 July 1949, India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement establishing a cease-fire line to be supervised by the observers. These observers formed the nucleus of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).

UNMOGIP'S ACTIVITIES

Following the termination of UNCIP, the Security Council, by its resolution 91 (1951) of 30 March 1951, decided that UNMOGIP should continue to supervise the cease-fire in Kashmir. Since that time, UNMOGIP has functioned as an autonomous operation, directed by the Chief Military Observer. UNMOGIP's functions were to observe and report, investigate complaints of cease-fire violations and submit its findings to each party and to the Secretary-General.

In early August 1965, hostilities again broke out on a large scale along the cease-fire line in Kashmir, and eventually spread to the international border between India and West Pakistan. The Security Council called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held before the hostilities began.

In Kashmir, the supervision called for by the Council was exercised by UNMOGIP. In addition, since the hostilities extended beyond the Kashmir cease-fire line, the Secretary-General established an administrative adjunct of UNMOGIP, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), as a temporary measure for the sole purpose of supervising the cease-fire along the India-Pakistan border outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Following the withdrawal of troops in February 1966, UNMOGIP reverted to its original task, while UNIPOM was terminated.

At the end of 1971, full-scale hostilities again broke out between India and Pakistan. By the time fighting had ended and a cease-fire had gone into effect, a number of positions on both sides of the 1949 cease-fire line had changed hands. In July 1972, India and Pakistan signed an agreement defining a Line of Control

in Kashmir which, with minor deviations, followed the same course as the cease-fire line established by the Karachi Agreement of 1949. India took the position that the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed, since it had related specifically to the cease-fire line under the Karachi Agreement and did not extend to the actual line of control that had come into existence in December 1971. Pakistan, however, did not accept this position.

PRESENT SITUATION

Given the disagreement between the two parties about UNMOGIP's mandate and functions, the Secretary-General's position has been that UNMOGIP can be terminated only by a decision of the Security Council. In the absence of such a decision, UNMOGIP has been maintained with the same administrative arrangements. Its task is to observe, to the extent possible, developments pertaining to the strict observance of the cease-fire of 17 December 1971 and to report thereon to the Secretary-General. The military authorities of Pakistan have continued to lodge with UNMOGIP complaints about cease-fire violations. The military authorities of India have lodged no complaints since January 1972 and have restricted the activities of the United Nations observers on the Indian side of the Line of Control. They have, however, continued to provide accommodation, transport and other facilities to UNMOGIP.

The Observer Group's Headquarters alternates between Srinagar in summer (mid-May to mid-November) and Rawalpindi in winter. An operational staff office is maintained in one of those two cities when it is not hosting the headquarters. The supervision of the cease-fire in the field is carried out by a number of field observation teams stationed on both sides of the Line of Control and also along the border between Pakistan and Kashmir.

COMPOSITION

The strength of UNMOGIP is 38 military observers from eight countries: Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Uruguay.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

UNMOGIP is financed from the regular budget of the United Nations. The annual cost of the operation is approximately $7 million.

UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

LOCATION: Cyprus

HEADQUARTERS: Nicosia

DURATION: March 1964 - to date

CURRENT STRENGTH: Approximately 1,500 military personnel and 38 civilian police

FATALITIES: 159

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. Oscar Camilión (Argentina)

FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Michael F. Minehane (Ireland)

BACKGROUND

Cyprus became independent on 16 August 1960 with a Constitution that was intended to balance the interests of the island's Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. A treaty of August 1960, entered into by Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, guaranteed the basic provisions of the Constitution and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus.

The application of the provisions of the Constitution, however, encountered difficulties from the very beginning and led to a succession of constitutional crises. The accumulated tension between the two communities resulted in the outbreak of violence on the island on 21 December 1963.

On 27 December, the United Nations Security Council met to consider a complaint by Cyprus charging intervention in its internal affairs and aggression by Turkey. Turkey maintained that Greek Cypriot leaders had tried for more than two years to nullify the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community and denied all charges of aggression.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNFICYP

On 15 February 1964, after all attempts to restore peace on the island had failed, the representatives of the United Kingdom and of Cyprus requested urgent action by the Security Council. On 4 March 1964, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 186 (1964), by which it recommended the establishment of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) with a mandate to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting, and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. Since then, the Council has periodically extended UNFICYP's mandate, usually for periods of six months at a time.

MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE STATUS QUO

In connection with the hostilities in July and August 1974, the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and have required the Force to perform certain additional functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire.

Following a de facto cease-fire, which came into effect on 16 August 1974, UNFICYP inspected the deployment of the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces, and cease-fire lines and a buffer zone were established between the areas controlled by the opposing parties. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres across the island. The buffer zone between the lines varies in width from less than 20 metres to some 7 kilometres, and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

Strict adherence to the military status quo in the buffer zone, as recorded by UNFICYP at the time, has become a vital element in preventing a recurrence of fighting. UNFICYP maintains constant surveillance through a system of 150 observation posts, 42 of which are permanently occupied, and through air, vehicle and foot patrols. The Force maintains a patrol track, which runs the length of the buffer zone and is used for surveillance, monitoring of agricultural activities, the

resupply of observation posts and rapid reaction to any incidents.

The task of UNFICYP is significantly complicated by the absence of a formal cease-fire agreement. As a result, UNFICYP is confronted with hundreds of incidents each year. The most serious incidents tend to occur in areas where the cease-fire lines are in close proximity, particularly in Nicosia and its suburbs. The Force investigates and acts upon all violations of the cease-fire and the status quo. Its reaction in each case depends on the nature of the incident and may include the deployment of troops, verbal and written protests and follow-up action to ensure that the violation has been rectified or will not recur.

HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

Another major function entrusted to UNFICYP is to encourage the fullest possible resumption of normal civilian activity in the buffer zone. To this end, it facilitates the resumption of farming in the buffer zone; assists both communities on matters related to the supply of electricity and water across the lines; endeavours to facilitate normal contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; facilitates provision of emergency medical services; and delivers mail and Red Cross messages across the lines. UNFICYP discharges certain humanitarian functions for the Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island and periodically visits Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part. In addition, UNFICYP delivers supplies to the small Maronite community in the northern part of Cyprus. UNFICYP also cooperates with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in providing relief assistance.

COMPOSITION OF UNFICYP

The operational elements of UNFICYP comprise military and civilian police personnel from Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

UNFICYP is the only United Nations peace-keeping operation that is not financed from assessed contributions by States members of the Organization. In accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964), the costs of the Force are met by the Governments providing the military contingents and by voluntary contributions received for this purpose by the United Nations. In addition, the Government of Cyprus provides at no cost areas for the headquarters, camps and other premises of UNFICYP. Following the recent withdrawal of the Danish battalion and reduction in the strength of the Austrian, Canadian and United Kingdom battalions (see RESTRUCTURING OF UNFICYP below), the annual cost of UNFICYP to the United Nations is approximately $19 million.

Under the existing arrangements, the troop-contributing Governments make available to the United Nations troops whose regular pay and allowances and normal *matériel* expenses they have agreed to pay themselves.

The United Nations is responsible for the operational costs for administrative and logistic support (e.g., rations, fuel, hire of vehicles, maintenance of premises, salaries and travel of non-military personnel) and for extra and extraordinary costs incurred by the troop-contributing Governments for which they seek reimbursement on the basis of separate agreements concluded by the United Nations with each of those Governments. These costs can be paid only from the voluntary contributions received for this purpose. Voluntary contributions, however, have consistently fallen short of the required funds, leaving the Special Account for UNFICYP with a total deficit of approximately $197 million for the period from the inception of the Force to mid-December 1992. As a result, reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries have been paid only up to December 1981.

The Secretary-General has repeatedly voiced his profound concern about the worsening financial situation confronting UNFICYP. He has suggested that the Force should be put on a sound and secure financial basis and that the best way to finance UNFICYP would be for its costs to be met from assessed contributions.

RESTRUCTURING OF UNFICYP

In his May 1992 report on UNFICYP activities, the Secretary-General spoke of the need to consult with the troop-contributing countries on their intentions on participation in the Force, including the timing of any reductions or withdrawals of their contingents, and on the possible future options for UNFICYP.

On 12 June 1992, the Security Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, extended the Force's mandate for a further six months, to 15 December 1992. It also requested the Secretary-General, after consulting the troop-contributing Governments, to submit specific proposals on the restructuring of the Force. On 21 September, the Secretary-General

informed the Council that the troop-contributing Governments had given firm indications of their intention to reduce "the operational commitment" of their contingents, and he outlined a plan for a possible restructuring of UNFICYP.

In his 1 December report, the Secretary-General indicated that the reductions in the Force would include the withdrawal of the Danish battalion (with some of its personnel remaining in UNFICYP headquarters), and the reductions in the British, Austrian and Canadian contingents by 198, 63 and 61 personnel, respectively. This would reduce UNFICYP's strength from 2,078 to 1,488 personnel, or by approximately 28 per cent. Consequently, the number of UNFICYP's sectors would be reduced from four to three, and that of the permanently occupied observation posts from 51 to 39. The Secretary-General stated that restructuring and reorganization of the remaining contingents commenced on 16 November 1992 to be completed in one month.

The Secretary-General also informed the Council of the intentions of the troop-contributing Governments to make further reductions in 1993. In the meantime, the Secretary-General requested them to maintain throughout the new six-month mandate period their strengths after implementation of the already announced reductions. He stated that he was exploring the possibility of finding additional countries to contribute troops to replace those being withdrawn. However, he felt that, even if the Force was radically restructured, financing could only be through assessed contributions.

The continued presence of the Force on the island remained indispensable, the Secretary-General concluded, and the reductions in the size of UNFICYP had major implications. The two parties in Cyprus would have an even greater responsibility to insure that there was no increase in tension and that conditions could be maintained for a speedy overall agreement. By the terms of an agreement concluded in 1989, the two sides unmanned positions and ceased patrols in certain sensitive locations in Nicosia. They must exercise maximum restraint and extend the unmanning agreement to all parts of the buffer zone. Further, the two sides need to collaborate so that their own agencies may resume humanitarian responsibilities that UNFICYP had assumed over the years.

On 14 December, the Security Council adopted its resolution 796 (1992) extending the UNFICYP mandate for a further period of six months, until 15 June 1993. The Council welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General to pursue his consultations with the troop-contributing Governments on the restructuring of the Force and asked him to report to the Council on that as soon as possible.

UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION

LOCATION: The demilitarized zone along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait

HEADQUARTERS: Umm Qasr

DURATION: April 1991 - to date

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 300 military observers, 200 other military personnel and some 90 international and 96 local civilian staff

FATALITIES: 1

CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER: Major-General Timothy K. Dibuama (Ghana)

BACKGROUND

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. The same day, the United Nations Security Council condemned the invasion and demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal. A few days later, the Council instituted economic sanctions against Iraq. The Council subsequently adopted a number of resolutions on various aspects of the situation and, on 29 November 1990, it decided to give Iraq until 15 January 1991 to implement those resolutions; if not, Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait were authorized to use "all necessary means" to uphold and implement the Council's resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area. The deadline passed and the next day the armed forces of those States began air attacks against Iraq, followed on 24 February by a ground offensive. Hostilities were suspended on 27 February, by which time the Iraqi forces had vacated Kuwait. On 3 April 1991, while still maintaining the economic sanctions against Iraq, the Security Council adopted resolution 687 (1991) which set an elaborate series of conditions for a cease-fire and established the machinery for the supervision of those conditions. Following Iraq's acceptance of that resolution's provisions, the cease-fire became a formal one.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIKOM

By resolution 687 (1991) the Council established, among other things, a demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait to be monitored by a United Nations observer unit and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Council for approval a plan for the unit's immediate deployment. The Secretary-General reported back on 5 April 1991, and on 9 April the Security Council approved his plan for the setting up of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) (resolution 689 (1991)). It decided further that the modalities for the Mission should be reviewed every six months.

The mandate of the Mission is to monitor the Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway between Iraq and Kuwait and the DMZ; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in, and surveillance of, the demilitarized zone; and to observe any hostile action mounted from the territory of one State against the other. The Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway is about 40 kilometres (25 miles) long. The DMZ, which is about 200 kilometres (125 miles) long, extends 10 kilometres (6 miles) into Iraq and 5 kilometres (3 miles) into Kuwait.

The military observers of UNIKOM are unarmed. UNIKOM does not have the authority or the capacity to take physical action to prevent the entry of military personnel or equipment into the DMZ. Responsibility for the maintenance of law and order rests with the Governments of Iraq and Kuwait in their respective parts of the zone. In the DMZ, the police are only allowed sidearms.

UNIKOM'S ACTIVITIES

The UNIKOM advance party arrived in the area on 13 April 1991. By 6 May, the Mission was fully deployed. UNIKOM then monitored the withdrawal of

the armed forces that were still deployed in its assigned zone. That withdrawal having been completed, the DMZ established by the Security Council came into effect at 2000 hours GMT on 9 May, and UNIKOM assumed in full its observation responsibilities.

UNIKOM's concept of operations is based on a combination of patrol and observation bases, observation points, ground and air patrols, investigation teams and liaison with the parties at all levels.

UNIKOM enjoys full freedom of movement throughout the DMZ and observes the length and breadth of the zone. It verifies that no military personnel and equipment are within the zone and that no military fortifications and installations are maintained in it. For operational purposes, UNIKOM has divided the DMZ into three sectors. Each sector has a headquarters and six observation posts/patrol bases, from which the observers patrol their assigned sectors and visit temporary observation points established in areas of particular activity or where roads and tracks enter the DMZ. In fact, all movements including supply runs are used for observation. UNIKOM patrols the Khawr 'Abd Allah waterway by helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft. There are also air patrols in the DMZ, especially in the southern sector, where mines and unexploded ordnance limit UNIKOM's ability to carry out ground patrols.

Mines and unexploded ordnance have been a serious hazard from the beginning of the Mission. UNIKOM engineers have cleared some 1,350 kilometres of patrol track as well as the sites for observation posts, camps and helicopter pads and disposed of some 13,200 mines and pieces of unexploded ordnance.

Iraqi and Kuwaiti authorities, including police, function in their respective part of the DMZ. However, UNIKOM established the principle that they should maintain a reasonable distance (about 1,000 metres) from the boundary line shown on UNIKOM's map. If their functions should require them to approach closer than 1,000 metres, the authorities are expected to consult UNIKOM in advance. Such consultation enables UNIKOM to take measures to avoid incidents.

UNIKOM has also maintained contact and provided technical support to other United Nations missions working in Iraq and Kuwait, in particular to the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission and to the United Nations office dealing with the return of property from Iraq to Kuwait. UNIKOM has provided movement control in respect of all United Nations aircraft operating in the area.

UNIKOM headquarters is located at Umm Qasr. The Mission maintains liaison offices in Baghdad and Kuwait City and a logistic base at Doha (Kuwait).

Since May 1991 to January 1993, UNIKOM observed mainly three types of violations: minor incursions on the ground by small groups of soldiers; overflights by military aircraft; and the carrying by policemen of weapons other than sidearms. UNIKOM also investigated a number of complaints by Iraq and Kuwait.

REINFORCEMENT OF UNIKOM IS DECIDED

On 11 January 1993, following a series of incidents on the newly demarcated boundary between Iraq and Kuwait involving Iraqi intrusions into the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ and unauthorized retrieval of property from Kuwaiti territory, the Security Council issued a statement, in which it, *inter alia*, condemned such actions and invited the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities for restoring UNIKOM to its full strength and to consider in an emergency the need for rapid reinforcement, as well as any other suggestions with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of UNIKOM.

In response, the Secretary-General submitted, on 18 January, a report on this subject. He recalled that UNIKOM had been established as an observation mission. In case of violations, the observers, who were unarmed, reported and made representations, or representations were made at a higher level either in the field or at United Nations Headquarters. Under its original mandate, UNIKOM had neither the authority nor the means to enforce Security Council decisions.

The Secretary-General noted that the January 1993 border incidents had been closely monitored by UNIKOM and reported to United Nations Headquarters. In addition, the Mission made immediate representations to Iraqi personnel on the spot as well as to the Iraqi military authorities. Representations were also made at United Nations Headquarters.

The Secretary-General concluded that UNIKOM had thus performed the function for which it was designed and for which its strength was sufficient. If, however, the Security Council should decide that UNIKOM's present mandate did not permit an adequate response to such violations as had occurred and that UNIKOM should be able to prevent and redress them, the Secretary-General continued, then UNIKOM would require a capacity to take physical action. Such action could be taken to prevent or, if that failed, redress: (a) small-scale violations of the DMZ; (b) viola-

tions of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, for example by civilians or police; and (c) problems that might arise from the presence of Iraqi installations and Iraqi citizens and their assets in the DMZ on the Kuwaiti side of the newly demarcated boundary.

The Secretary-General noted that these tasks could not be performed by unarmed observers. In their place, UNIKOM would have to be provided with infantry in sufficient numbers. He estimated that three infantry battalions would be required giving UNIKOM a strength of 3,645, including support elements. UNIKOM would be provided with the weapons integral to its infantry battalions, but not authorized to initiate enforcement action. It would use force only in self-defence, which would include resistance to attempts to prevent it by force from discharging its duties.

The Secretary-General emphasized that the scenario for a reinforced UNIKOM was based on the assumption that the Government of Iraq as well as the Government of Kuwait would cooperate with the restructured Mission. In the absence of such cooperation, it would become impossible for UNIKOM to carry out its functions, in which case the Security Council would need to consider alternative measures.

Subsequently, the Security Council, by its resolution 806 (1993), approved the Secretary-General's report and requested him to plan and execute a phased deployment of the strengthening of UNIKOM. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report to it on any step he intended to take following an initial deployment.

COMPOSITION

In its original deployment, UNIKOM has an authorized strength of 300 military observers provided by Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, China, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. Administrative and logistic support has been provided by Canada (engineers), Chile (helicopters), Denmark (logistics) and Norway (medical). Two fixed-wing aircraft operated by civilians have been made available by the Government of Switzerland. In addition, UNIKOM includes 90 international and 96 local civilian staff. Initially, to provide essential security during the setting-up phase, UNIKOM included five infantry companies, drawn from the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). These troops were withdrawn by the end of June 1991.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The annual cost to the United Nations of UNIKOM is approximately $67 million. As at 31 January 1993, total contributions outstanding to the Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation to 30 April 1993 amounted to approximately $37 million.

The Secretary-General has estimated that the cost associated with the strengthening of UNIKOM would amount to some $112 million for an initial six-month period. It has been further estimated that the additional monthly cost thereafter would be approximately $12 million. The costs of the Mission are to be met by the assessed contributions of the United Nations Member States.

UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II

LOCATION: Angola

HEADQUARTERS: Luanda

DURATION: June 1991 - 31 October 1992. An extension was authorized until 30 January 1993 and the mission is currently operating on a further extension until 30 April 1993

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 350 military observers, 126 police monitors, 87 international civilian staff and 155 local staff, and up to 400 electoral observers

CURRENT STRENGTH: 78 military observers, 30 police observers, 14 paramedics, 68 international civilian staff and 116 local staff

FATALITIES: 1

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CHIEF OF MISSION: Miss Margaret Joan Anstee (United Kingdom)

BACKGROUND

The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) was originally established by the Security Council on 20 December 1988 at the request of the Governments of Angola and Cuba. Its task was to verify the phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in accordance with the timetable agreed between the two Governments. The withdrawal was completed by 25 May 1991 — more than one month before the scheduled date. On 6 June, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that UNAVEM I had carried out, fully and effectively, the mandate entrusted to it.

Meanwhile, on 17 May 1991, the Government of Angola requested the Secretary-General to ensure the participation of the United Nations in verifying the implementation of the Peace Accords for Angola, initialled by the Angolan Government and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) on 1 May 1991, and consequently to prolong UNAVEM's presence in Angola. In accordance with the Accords, the United Nations was to verify the arrangements agreed by the Angolan parties for the monitoring of the cease-fire and for the monitoring of the Angolan police during the cease-fire period. On 30 May, following the Secretary-General's recommendation, the Security Council adopted its resolution 696 (1991) entrusting a new mandate to UNAVEM (thereafter UNAVEM II) and establishing the Mission for a period of 17 months, until the general elections were held in Angola in the fall of 1992.

VERIFICATION OF CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS

The United Nations verification operation began as soon as the Angolan Peace Accords were formally signed on 31 May 1991. Advance parties of observers were deployed to the field on 2 June 1991. Subsequently, UNAVEM II teams of unarmed military observers were deployed at some 46 locations ("assembly areas") where the troops of the two sides were assembled during the cease-fire, as well as at several "critical points" (certain seaports, airports and border posts). In essence, their task was to verify that joint monitoring groups, composed in equal numbers of representatives of the Angolan Government and of UNITA and responsible for monitoring on the spot the observance of the cease-fire, carried out their responsibilities. Working closely with these monitoring groups, UNAVEM II verification teams provided support in the investigation and resolution of alleged violations of the cease-fire. They responded to requests for assistance and used their good offices to resolve problems within monitoring groups. In addition, UNAVEM II took the initiative in monitoring some aspects of the Accords such as the regular counting of troops and weapons in the assembly areas, as well as monitoring of the

assembled troops, demobilized troops, and troops selected to join the new Angolan Armed Forces.

The neutrality of the Angolan police was to be verified by monitoring teams also composed of members designated by the Government of Angola and by UNITA. Their work was verified by UNAVEM II police observers. The monitoring teams and UNAVEM observers were to visit police facilities, examine activities of the police and, if necessary, investigate alleged violations of political rights. The Angolan police monitoring teams were established in all 18 Angolan provinces only in June 1992, although UNAVEM II police observers were present in the designated areas by October 1991.

On many occasions the United Nations conveyed to the two sides suggestions to overcome difficulties related to the assembly and the demobilization of troops, proper custody of weapons, the monitoring of the police, as well as to other matters relating to the peace process. At the request of the two parties, the United Nations launched an emergency food programme to relieve food shortages in the assembly areas.

ENLARGEMENT OF UNAVEM II'S MANDATE

The Peace Accords for Angola provided for "free and fair elections for a new Government" under "the supervision of international election observers". On 5 December 1991, the Secretary-General received two letters signed by the Minister for External Relations of Angola. One of the letters contained a request for United Nations technical assistance to help the Angolan Government to prepare for and conduct the forthcoming elections. The other letter contained a formal request to the Secretary-General to send United Nations observers to follow the Angolan electoral procedure until its completion in the fall of 1992. It was later announced that elections would be held on 29 and 30 September 1992.

An agreement on technical assistance was signed with the Angolan Government in January 1992. As regards United Nations observation of the first-ever elections in Angola, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council on 20 December 1991 that he intended to recommend that the Council authorize such a mission. On 6 February 1992, the Secretary-General informed the Council of his decision to appoint Miss Margaret Joan Anstee as his Special Representative to coordinate the current and projected activities of the United Nations in connection with the Angola Peace Accords, and as the Chief of UNAVEM II. On 3 March, following the Special Representative's visit to Angola, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his report with recommendations concerning the United Nations role in observing the forthcoming elections. On 24 March, the Security Council, by its resolution 747 (1992), decided to enlarge UNAVEM II's mandate to include election observation in Angola.

OBSERVATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESS

In March 1992, the office of the Special Representative was established in Luanda, the capital of Angola, to coordinate all United Nations activities related to the Angolan peace process. In addition to its deployed military and police observers and civilian staff, UNAVEM II was enlarged to include an Electoral Division, headed by a Chief Electoral Officer. Offices of the Electoral Division were established in Luanda, in the six Angolan regions and in the capitals of all 18 provinces. Approximately 100 international staff and the requisite number of local staff were deployed for the regional and provincial electoral offices.

The United Nations role was to observe and verify the elections, not to organize them. The electoral process was organized and directed by the National Electoral Council (NEC), on which all legalized political parties in Angola were represented, and supported by technical assistance provided by experts and consultants from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The electoral process comprised four phases: the registration of voters from 20 May to 10 August; the electoral campaign from 29 August to 28 September; the presidential and legislative elections on 29 and 30 September; and the counting of the votes, investigation of complaints and announcement of the final results by the President of NEC on 17 October.

In his report to the Security Council dated 9 September, the Secretary-General stated that the results of the registration exercise had surpassed expectations, with NEC reporting the registration of 4.86 million eligible voters, representing some 92 per cent of an estimated voting population of 5.3 million.

The electoral campaign was conducted without major violence, although there were reports of intimidation by some political parties, notably UNITA and the Movimento Popular para a Libertaçao de Angola (MPLA), as well as difficulties of access to certain areas, particularly those controlled by UNITA. The 18 political parties which had presented candidates campaigned actively. There were complaints, especially

from the smaller parties, about the continued existence of the Government and UNITA armies, the slow progress in demobilization and in forming the new Angolan Armed Forces, and lack of access to the Government-controlled radio and television, whose partiality was criticized.

UNAVEM II electoral observers monitored the campaign, contributed to civic education programmes and provided information on UNAVEM II's role. In addition, UNAVEM II and UNDP organized the air support operation, consisting of 45 helicopters and 15 fixed-wing aircraft, to overcome the logistical difficulties in reaching the more inaccessible polling stations. For the observation and verification of the voting on 29 and 30 September 1992, UNAVEM II deployed 400 electoral observers. Operating largely as two-person mobile teams, the observers covered all 18 provinces and most of the 164 municipalities, and visited about 4,000 of some 6,000 polling stations.

As regards its mandate in military matters, UNAVEM II continued to carry out its verification functions at the assembly areas up to and after the announced disbandment of the two former armies of FAPLA (Government) and FALA (UNITA) on 27 September 1992. As the elections drew near, demobilization formally accelerated. By 7 October, a total of 96,620 Government troops had been demobilized, representing 80 per cent of the projected figure. However, a much lower proportion of ex-FALA troops were demobilized.

United Nations police observers continued their verification of police neutrality, with the Angolan joint monitoring groups being almost entirely dependent on UNAVEM II for transport and communications. Little progress was made in developing a representative national police force. Soon after the elections, however, UNITA withdrew its cooperation.

SITUATION DETERIORATES

On 1 October 1992, the Secretary-General's Special Representative issued a statement in which she noted that the great majority of the registered voters had cast their ballots in peaceful and orderly conditions, despite organizational and logistical difficulties.

However, complaints were raised on 3 October and thereafter by UNITA and some other parties of widespread, massive and systematic irregularities and fraud during the elections. The Secretary-General urged Dr. Jonas Savimbi of UNITA not to reject the elections, pending investigation of his complaints, and emphasized the urgency of a meeting between him and President José Eduardo dos Santos. The complaints were investigated by NEC, with the active assistance of UNAVEM II. Investigative commissions were sent to all 18 provinces, but found no conclusive evidence of a systematic fraud.

Meanwhile, a major violation of the Peace Accords had occurred on 5 October, when 11 former UNITA generals, including the commander of UNITA's army, withdrew from the new, unified Angolan Armed Forces, in protest at what they called "fraud and cheating" in the elections.

In view of these developments, the Security Council sent to Angola, from 11 to 14 October, an ad hoc Commission, composed of representatives of Cape Verde, Morocco, the Russian Federation and the United States, to support implementation of the Peace Accords. Notwithstanding all diplomatic efforts, however, the political and military situation in the country continued to deteriorate.

On 17 October 1992, the President of NEC announced the official election results. More than 91 per cent of those registered had voted. MPLA had won the legislative elections, with 53.74 per cent of the votes, against UNITA's 34.1 per cent. In the presidential elections, President dos Santos had received 49.57 per cent, against Dr. Savimbi's 40.07 per cent; since neither had achieved 50 per cent, the Electoral Law required a second round. The Secretary-General's Special Representative issued a statement on 17 October saying "there was no conclusive evidence of major systematic or widespread fraud, or that the irregularities were of magnitude to have a significant effect on the results officially announced on 17 October". She emphasized that, "with all deficiencies taken into account, the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 can be considered to have been generally free and fair."

Immediately after the election results were announced, UNITA launched a nationwide operation to occupy municipalities by force and remove the Government's local administrative structures. On 27 October, the Secretary-General conveyed to the Security Council his serious concern at the rising tension. The Council once again called upon both parties to abide by all their commitments under the Peace Accords, in particular the confinement of their troops and collection of weapons, demobilization and the formation of the unified Angolan Armed Forces. It requested UNITA to respect the results of the elections and urged the leaders of the two parties to engage in

immediate dialogue to enable the second round of the presidential elections to be held.

On 30 October, the Security Council, faced with further alarming reports of resumed hostilities in many parts of the country, adopted resolution 785 (1992), extending the existing mandate of UNAVEM II until 30 November 1992, and endorsing the statement by the Secretary-General's Special Representative on the elections having been generally free and fair.

Barely 23 hours later, on 31 October, heavy fighting broke out between the Government and UNITA forces, especially in the major cities. The Secretary-General's efforts, supported by a number of Member States, resulted in a cease-fire which came officially into effect on 2 November. UNAVEM II, which kept its military, police and civilian presence intact at 67 locations throughout the country, worked to maintain the cease-fire, patrolling trouble-spots and using its good offices to foster dialogue between the parties.

FURTHER DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

Diplomatic efforts continued since the cease-fire to arrange a meeting between President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi. Immediately after the cease-fire, the Government stipulated four conditions for resuming political dialogue between the two leaders: (a) commitment to uphold the cease-fire, pursue dialogue and renounce violence; (b) commitment to the principles of the Peace Accords; (c) acceptance of the results of the September 1992 legislative elections; and (d) greater United Nations involvement in the peace process and the second round of the presidential election.

On 5 November, the Secretary-General sent Mr. Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, to Angola to assist the Special Representative in her continuing efforts to help implement the cease-fire, put the peace process back on track and explore the future role of UNAVEM II. After the meetings in Angola, the Secretary-General's envoys concluded that the desire for a larger United Nations involvement constituted the main common ground between the two sides. Also, as a result of a telephone conversation and an exchange of letters with Mr. Goulding, Dr. Savimbi confirmed, in a letter dated 12 November, that UNITA accepted the results of the legislative elections so as to permit the implementation of the peace process.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL EVALUATES SITUATION

On 25 November, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a detailed report on the situation in Angola, and recommended to extend the mandate of UNAVEM II for a further two-month period until 31 January 1993. In the report, the Secretary-General stated that although it was too soon to analyse the causes for the deteriorating situation in Angola, it was already clear that a "root cause" was the incomplete fulfilment of key provisions in the Peace Accords. Among those failings were the less than effective demobilization and storage of weapons; the delay in creating the unified Angolan Armed Forces which only formally came into being a few days before the elections; the failure to re-establish effective central administration in many parts of the country; and the delay in setting up a neutral police force. It had also been difficult to create in 16 months, after as many years of civil war, an atmosphere of mutual confidence, tolerance and respect.

Yet, the Secretary-General emphasized, "it is also too soon to despair of the Angolan peace process", noting the renewed commitment to the process by both parties. At the same time, he made it clear that he could not recommend an enlargement of UNAVEM II's mandate and strength unless both sides could convince him that they would be genuine in their adherence to, and fulfilment of, the Peace Accords, especially their key provisions relating to the dissolution of the existing armies and the creation of unified and non-partisan military and police forces.

On 30 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 793 (1992) extended UNAVEM II's mandate until 31 January 1993. The Council demanded, *inter alia*, that the Government of Angola and UNITA scrupulously observe the cease-fire, stop military confrontations and all offensive troop movements, and create the conditions for completing the peace process in Angola. It appealed to the two parties to engage in a dialogue aimed at national reconciliation and at the participation of all parties in the democratic process, and to agree on a clear timetable for the fulfilment of their commitments under the Peace Accords.

Meanwhile, the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative resulted in a meeting, under UNAVEM II auspices on 26 November 1992 in Namibe, between senior delegations from the two sides, where they pledged themselves to full acceptance of the validity of the Peace Accords, to an effective cease-fire throughout the country and the im-

mediate cessation of all offensive movements, and to the need for a larger United Nations involvement. However, almost immediately, this progress was followed by a setback when, on 29 November, UNITA forces took the northern cities of Uije and Negage. Attempts to restore dialogue between the two sides, including the Secretary-General's personal invitation to President dos Santos and Dr. Savimbi to meet with him at an agreed location, failed.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUGGESTS THREE OPTIONS FOR UNAVEM II

On 8 January 1993, the Secretary-General reported that the situation in Angola had severely deteriorated since the beginning of the year. There were outbreaks of heavy fighting in at least 10 provincial capitals and other population centres, with each side blaming the other for initiating those hostilities. In his further report submitted to the Council on 21 January, the Secretary-General stated that "to all intents and purposes, Angola has returned to civil war, and is probably in an even worse situation than that which prevailed before the Peace Accords were signed in May 1991". The conflict engulfed towns and population centres in a way unprecedented during the previous 16 years, and there were "disturbing but unconfirmed reports" that new supplies of arms might be entering the country.

In addition, the Secretary-General stated, the widespread fighting and the absence of government administration in much of the countryside had led to widespread hunger and the flight of large numbers of people from the towns involved in the conflict. "An already serious humanitarian situation has become catastrophic in many areas", he pointed out, and the capacity of international humanitarian agencies to provide assistance had been severely disrupted.

According to the report, the crisis arising after the September 1992 elections thrust UNAVEM II into a central mediating role. However, with the outbreak of violent and widespread hostilities, and the total collapse of the joint monitoring mechanisms, "UNAVEM II's original mandate has become less and less relevant". Even its mediating role had been increasingly limited by the deteriorating security situation. At the same time, UNAVEM II teams in the field faced mounting dangers, which became so extensive that 45 of UNAVEM's 67 locations had to be evacuated.

The Secretary-General outlined three options for the future of UNAVEM II. The first option was to maintain the Mission at its current strength; the second was to reduce UNAVEM's provincial deployment to approximately six locations. The Secretary-General's preferred option was to confine UNAVEM II's current deployment to the capital, Luanda, but with the capability to deploy to one or two outstations if needed, to support his Special Representative's peacemaking efforts.

On 29 January, the Security Council, by its resolution 804 (1993), extended the mandate of UNAVEM II for a period of three months, until 30 April 1993. It did so with the proviso that, as a provisional measure based on security considerations, the Secretary-General could concentrate UNAVEM II's deployment in Luanda, and at his discretion, in other provincial locations, with the levels of personnel and equipment he deemed appropriate to allow for the subsequent expeditious redeployment of UNAVEM II as soon as this became feasible. By other provisions of the resolution, the Council demanded, *inter alia*, that the two parties cease fire immediately, restore continued and meaningful dialogue, and agree on a clear timetable for the full implementation of the Peace Accords. Subsequently, the Secretary-General decided to temporarily decrease the strength of the Mission to what it is at present (see COMPOSITION OF UNAVEM II below).

FURTHER EFFORTS TO ARRANGE DIALOGUE

In January 1993, fighting intensified throughout the Angolan national territory between the Angolan Government and UNITA forces, particularly in the central city of Huambo. After repeated efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to arrange a dialogue between the two sides, the Government and UNITA agreed to a cease-fire meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to discuss the fulfilment of various prerequisites for the effective re-launching of the peace process in Angola.

During the first round of Addis Ababa talks, which were held on 27 – 30 January 1993 under United Nations auspices and chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, the Government of Angola and UNITA reached agreement on a number of items, but some key issues remained to be solved before a cease-fire could be arranged. The parties accordingly agreed to meet again in Addis Ababa on 10 February, in order to resolve the outstanding questions.

UNITA subsequently requested a postponement of the meeting, on the grounds that their delegation had encountered serious difficulties in returning to its base in Angola to report on the first meeting and receive instructions. UNITA further requested UNAVEM II to

provide transport and certain security guarantees to enable their delegation to attend the next round of talks. UNAVEM II accepted this and made proposals which were generally acceptable to UNITA. It was then agreed with both the Government and UNITA that the new date for the second round of talks would be 26 February. On the eve of the talks, the Secretary-General appealed to the Government of Angola and UNITA to "make all possible efforts to display the necessary spirit of compromise so that an agreement on the implementation of an effective cease-fire can be concluded speedily". The Secretary-General emphasized that this was necessary to enable the resumption of the political dialogue as well as to ensure that humanitarian help be delivered to millions of suffering Angolans.*

COMPOSITION OF UNAVEM II

Originally, UNAVEM II's authorized strength was 350 military observers and 90 police observers. There were also a civilian air unit and a medical unit, as well as some 87 international and 155 local civilian staff. In May 1992, the Secretary-General recommended, and the Security Council agreed, to increase the police strength of the Mission to 126 officers. Military and police observers were provided by Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, former Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe. In addition, during the polling, the Electoral Division fielded a total of 400 electoral observers. They were of some 90 nationalities and included staff members from the United Nations system, observers contributed by Member States and UNAVEM II's military and police observers.

Currently, in accordance with the Secretary-General's decision, approved by the Security Council in its resolution 804 (1993), the strength of UNAVEM II is being reduced to 78 military observers, 30 police observers, 14 paramedics, 68 international civilian staff and 116 local staff, deployed at Luanda and five other sites (Cabinda, Sumbe, Lubango, Benguela and Namibe) in Angola.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The cost to the United Nations of UNAVEM II for the 17-month period from 1 June 1991 to 31 October 1992 amounted to approximately $109 million. The cost of the Mission for the period from 1 November 1992 to 28 February 1993 was expected to total some $24 million. As to the period 1 March - 30 April 1993, UNAVEM II's monthly expenditures have been estimated at approximately $2 million. The costs of the operation are met by assessed contributions from the Member States. As at 31 January 1993, total contributions outstanding to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I and UNAVEM II) from the inception of the operation through 28 February 1993 amounted to approximately $37 million.

* Subsequently, the second round of peace talks in Addis Ababa, scheduled for 26 February 1993, had to be cancelled, due to failure of UNITA to send its delegation there.

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR

LOCATION: El Salvador

HEADQUARTERS: San Salvador

DURATION: July 1991 - to date

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: Approximately 1,000 military and police personnel and 146 international civilian staff

FATALITIES: 1

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CHIEF OF MISSION: Mr. Iqbal Riza (Pakistan)
(Mr. Riza is to be succeeded by Mr. Augusto Ramirez Ocampo of Colombia, effective 1 April 1993)

BACKGROUND

The establishment of ONUSAL came about as a result of a complex negotiating process, initiated by the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in September 1989 and conducted by the parties under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General. The objective of the negotiations was to achieve a series of political agreements aimed at resolving the prolonged armed conflict in El Salvador by political means as speedily as possible, promoting democratization in the country, guaranteeing unrestricted respect for human rights and reunifying Salvadorian society. It was envisaged that implementation of all agreements that might be signed between the two parties would be subject to verification by the United Nations.

The first substantive agreement was achieved on 26 July 1990, when the Government of El Salvador and FMLN signed, at San José, Costa Rica, the Agreement on Human Rights. This Agreement provided for the establishment of a United Nations verification mission to monitor nationwide respect for and the guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms in El Salvador. According to the Agreement, the Mission was to take up its duties as of the cessation of the armed conflict. Shortly after signing the Agreement, however, the two parties independently requested that the Mission be set up even before a cease-fire.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ONUSAL

On 20 May 1991, following the Secretary-General's recommendation, the Security Council, by its resolution 693 (1991), decided to establish the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), as an integrated peace-keeping operation, to monitor all agreements concluded between the Government of El Salvador and FMLN. The Mission's initial mandate was to verify the compliance by the parties with the San José Agreement on Human Rights.

At that stage, the tasks of the Mission included actively monitoring the human rights situation in El Salvador; investigating specific cases of alleged human rights violations; promoting human rights in the country; making recommendations for the elimination of violations; and reporting on these matters to the Secretary-General and, through him, to the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.

VERIFICATION OF THE SAN JOSÉ AGREEMENT

ONUSAL was launched on 26 July 1991, at which time it absorbed a small preparatory office established in San Salvador in January 1991. In assuming its initial tasks, ONUSAL adopted a two-phase approach. During the preparatory phase, from July through September, ONUSAL set up its regional offices and laid the operational and conceptual bases for its future work. On 1 October 1991, ONUSAL entered its second phase of operations, in which it began to investigate cases and situations involving allegations of human rights violations and to follow them up systematically with the competent State organs and with FMLN. The purpose of these activities has been to establish the veracity of such allegations and, where required, to

follow the actions taken to identify and punish those responsible and to deter such violations in future. During this phase, ONUSAL has significantly expanded its contacts with the parties, establishing flexible, stable coordination mechanisms with them. In addition, the Mission initiated both a human rights education programme and an information campaign on human rights.

ENLARGEMENT OF ONUSAL'S MANDATE

Meanwhile, steady progress was made in the negotiations on other political agreements aimed at ending the armed conflict in El Salvador. On 31 December 1991, following more than two weeks of protracted negotiations at United Nations Headquarters in New York, the parties signed the Act of New York which, combined with the agreements previously signed at San José (26 July 1990), Mexico City (27 April 1991) and New York (25 September 1991), completed the negotiations on all substantive issues of the peace process. The parties also agreed that the final peace agreements would be signed at Mexico City on 16 January 1992.

The Agreements included two in particular, requiring a substantial enlargement of ONUSAL's mandate. These were the Agreement on the Cessation of the Armed Conflict, according to which ONUSAL was to verify all aspects of the cease-fire and the separation of forces, and the Agreement on the National Civil Police, which envisaged that ONUSAL should monitor the maintenance of public order during the transition period while the new National Civil Police was being set up.

On 14 January 1992, following the Secretary-General's recommendation, the Security Council, by its resolution 729 (1992), unanimously decided to enlarge ONUSAL's mandate and to increase its strength in order to fulfil verification requirements of the agreements. After signature of the "Peace Agreement" in Mexico City on 16 January 1992, the Secretary-General took immediate steps to enable the Mission to implement its expanded mandate.

ONUSAL STRUCTURE

In addition to the Human Rights Division, which was established in ONUSAL's first phase of operation to verify the implementation of the Agreement on Human Rights, two new Divisions have been established — a Military Division and a Police Division.

All three Divisions are under the overall direction of the Chief of Mission, whose office, composed of a team of political affairs officers, is directly responsible for monitoring and promoting the implementation of all the political aspects of the Peace Agreement.

The Human Rights Division, which continues to be responsible for verifying the implementation of the Human Rights Agreement, comprises approximately 40 human rights observers, legal advisers and educators. The Regional Coordinators of the Division also deal with all the political aspects of the Mission's mandate, and report directly to the Chief of Mission in this respect.

The Military Division, established on 20 January 1992 with an authorized strength of 380 military observers, was responsible for verifying the Agreement on the Cessation of the Armed Conflict, dealing with the redeployment of the Armed Forces of El Salvador to the positions they would maintain in normal peace time, and the concentration of the FMLN forces in agreed "designated locations" in the areas of conflict. Its function was to monitor the troops of both parties in these locations, verify the inventories of weapons and personnel, authorize and accompany the movements of both forces, and receive and investigate complaints of violations. The Division was reduced in number following the culmination, on 15 December 1992, of the cease-fire process (see COMPOSITION below). Nevertheless, a number of verification tasks still remain to be carried out by ONUSAL military observers within the framework of the Peace Agreement.

The creation of a new police force — the National Civil Police, to replace the old public security structures — is one of the fundamental components of the Peace Agreements. The Police Division of ONUSAL, composed mostly of specialists in the organization and operation of civilian police forces, monitors National Police activities during the transition from armed conflict to national reconciliation, thereby providing the Salvadorian people with a sense of security. Although never realized, the authorized strength of the Police Division is 631. Its current strength is 294. The deployment of police observers throughout the territory of El Salvador began on 7 February 1992.

ONUSAL police observers continue to supervise and provide instruction to the Auxiliary Transition Police (PAT), which began operating in October 1992. Made up of recruits from the National Public Security Academy, PAT is responsible for maintaining public order and security in the ex-conflict zones until their substitution by the new National Civil Police. Following a 15-day preparatory course, recruits serve short stints in designated areas as PAT and then return to the Academy to complete their studies.

Upon the request of the Salvadorian Government, ONUSAL police observers will also be providing consultancy and other support services to the new National Civil Police, once deployed. These tasks initially will have to be carried out simultaneously with those already mentioned, namely assisting and accompanying the National Police and supporting and supervising PAT.

ADJUSTMENTS TO THE TIMETABLE

Under the timetable for the implementation of the Peace Agreements, the process of ending the armed conflict was to have been completed by 31 October 1992. By that time, the Government of El Salvador was to have completed several major commitments of a political and institutional nature and FMLN was to have demobilized all its combatants, destroyed their armament and reintegrated them into civilian life under programmes provided by the Government.

However, the tightness of the timetable, together with the complexity of the issues involved, led to major delays in completing certain commitments crucial for the overall implementation of the peace process. Consequently, adjustments had to be made, on 17 June and again on 19 August, to those parts of the timetable that had been affected. In both these adjustments the fulfilment of certain key commitments had to be postponed beyond 31 October. Among them were the provision of agricultural land in the former zones of conflict, which was originally to have been completed by the end of July 1992, and the establishment of the National Public Security Academy, which was due on 1 May.

On 30 September, FMLN informed the United Nations that, in order to maintain the link in the original timetable between the key undertakings of the two parties, it would suspend demobilization of its forces until new dates had been set for the start of the transfer of land and other aspects of the Agreement that had fallen behind schedule. On 13 October, the Secretary-General presented a proposal regarding the solution of the land issue, which was accepted by FMLN and the Government on 15 and 16 October, respectively.

While the problem of land was resolved, it became evident, however, that the complete dismantling of the FMLN military structure by 31 October 1992 would be difficult to achieve. On 23 October, the Secretary-General proposed to the parties a new target date of 15 December 1992. FMLN accepted the proposal contingent upon its acceptance by the Government. The Government, however, reserved its position on some aspects of the proposal and suspend restructuring, reduction and demobilization of i Forces.

In these circumstances, the Secretary-Gene ent Mr. Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-Gene for Peace-keeping Operations, and Mr. Alvaro de o, Senior Political Adviser to the Secretary-General to San Salvador to assist in overcoming difficulties. as informed subsequently that these consultation the parties led to arrangements for the formal en the armed conflict on 15 December. The arra ents also included agreement by President Alfredo ani of El Salvador to complete implementation of ec ommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on ca tion of the Armed Forces. The establishment of the Ad Hoc Commission was provided for by the Peace Agreements. It was set up on 19 May 1992, and submitted its report to President Cristiani and to the Secretary-General on 22 September. However, difficulties emerged, *inter alia*, regarding the timetable for the implementation of those recommendations.

ONUSAL has also followed closely all issues related to the creation of the new National Civil Police, the political participation of FMLN, the restoration of public administration in former zones of conflict, and reforms of the judicial and electoral systems. In addition, the Mission has participated as an observer in the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), mandated to oversee the implementation of all political agreements reached by the parties.

EXTENSION OF ONUSAL MANDATE

In his 23 November 1992 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General described ONUSAL's activities in support of the peace process and presented his recommendations on the Mission's future mandate and strength. The Secretary-General stated that, despite problems, the implementation of the Peace Agreements had advanced steadily and that the peace process in El Salvador continued to give every sign of being irreversible. Implementation of the Agreements in its entirety, he continued, would require flexibility and restraint on the part of the two parties, as well as continuing support from the international community, through ONUSAL and through voluntary contributions to support activities that the Government could not itself finance.

As regards ONUSAL, the Secretary-General anticipated that it would complete its mission by mid-1994. ONUSAL will monitor implementation of such major

undertakings as the reduction of the Armed Forces and the deployment of the National Civil Police; it has also been asked to verify the elections scheduled for March 1994. The Secretary-General planned to submit to the Security Council at appropriate intervals his recommendations on the future activities and strength of ONUSAL, taking into account progress made in implementing the peace process.

On the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council, by its resolution 791 (1992) of 30 November, extended the mandate of ONUSAL for a further six-month period, until 31 May 1993. The Council urged both the Government of El Salvador and FMLN to respect scrupulously the commitments they assumed under the Peace Agreements, and to exercise the utmost moderation and restraint, then and following the conclusion of the cease-fire plan, in order to respect the new deadlines for the successful completion of the peace process.

END OF THE ARMED CONFLICT

On 23 December 1992, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the armed conflict between the Government of El Salvador and FMLN had been brought formally to an end on 15 December in accordance with the agreed adjustments in the timetable for implementing the Peace Agreements. This event was marked by a ceremony presided over by President Cristiani and attended by the Secretary-General and a number of international statesmen.

The Secretary-General described the event as a "definitive moment in the history of El Salvador, whose long-suffering people can now look forward to a future in which political, economic and social arguments will be settled through the processes of democracy and not by war". At the same time, he stressed that it did not mark the end of the peace process in El Salvador. It was important, he stated, that both parties, and the international community, should persevere in their efforts to ensure implementation of the remaining provisions of the Peace Agreements.

COMPOSITION

At its peak strength in February 1992, the Military Division comprised 368 military observers. By the end of January 1993, as the peace process progressed, it was reduced to a strength of 95. The strength of the Police Division is currently 294 observers. The Division will be phased out once the deployment of the new National Civil Police is completed in early 1994. In the event that ONUSAL is required to verify the March 1994 elections in El Salvador, the personnel needed for this task will be phased in as required by the electoral process and their assignment will end immediately after the elections.

ONUSAL military observers are provided by Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Ireland, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Venezuela. In addition, seven medical officers are provided by Argentina. Police observers come from Austria, Chile, France, Guyana, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Spain and Sweden. The Human Rights Division and other civilian staff of ONUSAL consists largely of staff members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, as well as those seconded from Member States.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The cost of ONUSAL for the 17-month period from July 1991 to 30 November 1992 has been estimated at approximately $47 million. The preliminary cost estimate associated with the extension of ONUSAL's mandate for a further period of six months, to 31 May 1993, is approximately $19 million. The costs of the operation are met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 31 January 1993, total contributions outstanding to the ONUSAL Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation to 28 February 1993 amounted to approximately $15 million.

UNITED NATIONS MISSION FOR THE REFERENDUM IN WESTERN SAHARA

LOCATION: Western Sahara

HEADQUARTERS: Laayoune

DURATION: September 1991 - to date

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: Approximately 1,600 military observers and troops, 300 police officers and about 800 to 1,000 civilian personnel

CURRENT STRENGTH: 228 military observers, 100 military support personnel and 103 international and local civilian staff members

FATALITIES: 2

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan (Pakistan)

FORCE COMMANDER, *a.i.*: Brigadier-General André Van Baelen (Belgium)

BACKGROUND

In 1985, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in cooperation with the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), initiated a joint mission of good offices in the search for a solution of the question of Western Sahara. On 11 August 1988, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Special Envoy of the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU presented, in separate meetings, to the parties to the conflict in Western Sahara, namely Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), a document referred to as "the settlement proposals". The document contained proposals for a just and definitive solution of the question of Western Sahara in conformity with 1960 General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). This would be accomplished by means of a cease-fire and the holding of a referendum without military or administrative constraints to enable the people of Western Sahara, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, to choose between independence and integration with Morocco.

On 27 June 1990, the Security Council, in its resolution 658 (1990), approved a report of the Secretary-General, which contained the full text of the settlement proposals as accepted by the two parties on 30 August 1988, as well as an outline of the Secretary-General's plan for implementing those proposals.

THE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

The implementation plan provided for a transitional period during which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, acting under the authority of the Secretary-General, would have sole and exclusive responsibility over all matters relating to the referendum, including its organization and conduct. The Special Representative would be assisted in his tasks by a deputy special representative and by an integrated group of United Nations civilian, military and civilian police personnel. This group would be known as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

According to the plan, the transitional period would begin with the coming into effect of a cease-fire and end with the proclamation of the results of the referendum. Following the announcement of a cease-fire, MINURSO would verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory; monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO troops to designated locations; take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees; oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (International Committee of the Red Cross); implement the repatriation programme (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees); identify and register qualified voters; organize and ensure a free referendum, and proclaim the results.

The plan stipulated that MINURSO would consist of the Special Representative and his office, and civilian, military and security units. The civilian component would range in size from about 800 to 1000 personnel, depending on the requirements of the various phases of the transitional period. At full strength, the military component would consist of approximately 1,695 personnel, and the Security Unit of about 300 police officers.

ESTABLISHMENT OF MINURSO

On 29 April 1991, the Security Council in its resolution 690 (1991) decided to establish MINURSO, in accordance with a report of the Secretary-General which further detailed the implementation plan. In approving the plan, the Security Council also accepted the timetable proposed in the Secretary-General's report. It was envisaged that the transitional period would begin no later than 16 weeks after the General Assembly approved the MINURSO budget and would last for 20 weeks. MINURSO would remain in the Territory for up to 26 weeks from the coming into effect of the cease-fire. The Secretary-General indicated, however, that the periods of time allowed for the various processes were estimates that could require adjustment.

The budget for MINURSO was approved by the General Assembly on 17 May 1991.

THE CEASE-FIRE

On 24 May 1991, in accordance with the plan, the Secretary-General proposed that the cease-fire should enter into effect on 6 September. Both parties accepted that date. During the following three months, however, it became clear that it would not be possible to complete before 6 September a number of tasks that were to be completed before the cease-fire. It also became clear that, notwithstanding the parties' earlier acceptance of the settlement plan, substantial areas of difference between them remained. One party therefore was not able to agree that the transition period should begin on 6 September 1991.

Meanwhile, hostilities had broken out in the Territory, interrupting an informal cease-fire that had been in effect for over two years. In these circumstances, the Secretary-General decided that the formal cease-fire should come into effect on 6 September as initially agreed, on the understanding that the transition period would begin as soon as the outstanding tasks had been completed. The Security Council supported his proposal that, during this delay, 100 military observers should be deployed in the Territory to verify the cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities in certain areas. The number of military observers was subsequently increased to 228 and certain logistics and administrative support staff were also sent to the field.

The primary function of MINURSO in its present limited deployment is restricted to verifying the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. This is done by direct observation of military forces and activities carried out by either party and verifying complaints of alleged cease-fire violations. United Nations military observers are deployed to ten team sites/observation posts in the northern and southern sectors of the Territory. The team sites, covering the main points of concern in the Territory, are the key element in monitoring the cease-fire. United Nations military observers operate in mobile patrols. Helicopter-borne patrols are also conducted to enhance MINURSO monitoring capability and react at short notice to complaints and violations.

The headquarters of the Mission has been established in the capital, Laayoune, with two regional headquarters in the northern and southern sectors of the Territory. A liaison office has also been established in Tindouf to maintain contact with the Algerian authorities and POLISARIO.

OTHER ASPECTS

According to the settlement plan, the referendum in Western Sahara should have taken place in January 1992. However, it has not been possible to proceed in conformity with the original timetable. While both parties have reiterated their confidence in the United Nations, their commitment to the settlement plan and their willingness to restore the momentum of the peace process, they continue to have divergent views and different interpretations of some of the key elements contained in the plan, including those with regard to the question of criteria for eligibility to vote in the referendum.

In spite of intensive efforts by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his Special Representative for Western Sahara, Mr. Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, to find mutually acceptable solutions, it has not been possible to put the implementation plan back on track. The most recent efforts included Mr. Yaqub-Khan's talks with the parties in June and July 1992; a further round of talks in August and September 1992; and an attempt to organize a meeting of 38 Western Saharan tribal chiefs in Geneva at the end of November, which had to be cancelled because of the differences relating to

the powers of some participants designated by the Moroccan party.

In his latest report on the situation in Western Sahara, submitted to the Security Council on 26 January 1993, the Secretary-General stated that the cancellation of the meeting in Geneva demonstrated the futility of the efforts undertaken "with vigor and resource" by his Special Representative over the past eight months to seek a way out of the existing deadlock. He suggested three possible options available under the circumstances, and requested guidance from the Council on how best to proceed.

A first option suggests the continuation, and if possible, intensification of talks. The Secretary-General believed, however, that the chances for success under this option were very slim.

A second option would require the immediate implementation of the settlement plan on the basis of the instructions for the review of applications for participation in the referendum, appearing in the annex to the 19 December 1991 report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. This may mean, the Secretary-General pointed out, that the implementation would have to proceed without the cooperation of one of the parties.

A third option would be to adopt an alternative approach not based on the settlement plan.*

COMPOSITION

The strength of MINURSO, in its present limited deployment, includes 228 military observers and 100 military support personnel provided by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela. In addition, 103 civilian staff members, 69 of whom are internationally recruited, are assigned to MINURSO in support of its military mandate.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The General Assembly, by its resolution 45/266 of 17 May 1991, appropriated an amount of $143 million for the operation of MINURSO. As at November 1992, there was a projected balance of approximately $71 million remaining from this appropriation. In December 1992, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments up to the amount of some $7 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period ending 28 February 1993 and that the amount be provided from the unencumbered balance of the appropriation provided for MINURSO. The operation is funded by assessed contributions of the United Nations Member States. As at 31 January 1993, total contributions outstanding to the MINURSO Special Account amounted to approximately $21 million.

* Subsequently, the Security Council, by its resolution 809 (1993), invited the Secretary-General to intensify efforts in order to resolve outstanding issues, and to make the necessary preparations for the referendum and to consult accordingly with the parties for the purpose of commencing voter registration starting with the updated lists of the 1974 census. The Secretary-General was requested to report to the Council, no later than May 1993, on the prospects and modalities for holding the referendum by the end of the current year at the latest. He was also requested to include proposals for the necessary adjustments to the present role and strength of MINURSO.

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

LOCATION: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

HEADQUARTERS: Zagreb, Croatia

DURATION: March 1992 - to date

STRENGTH: Some 23,000 military and civilian personnel

FATALITIES: 29

PERSONAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. Cyrus Vance (United States)

FORCE COMMANDER: Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar (India)
(Lieutenant-General Nambiar is succeeded by Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren of Sweden, effective 3 March 1993)

UNPROFOR IN CROATIA

Background

The United Nations became actively involved in the situation in Yugoslavia (a term which, for the purposes of this publication, is used to signify the republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) on 25 September 1991 when the Security Council, meeting at the ministerial level, unanimously adopted its resolution 713 (1991) expressing deep concern at the fighting in that country and calling on all States to implement immediately a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia". The Council commended and fully supported the efforts already undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia. By its resolution, the Council invited the Secretary-General to offer his assistance, in consultation with the Government of Yugoslavia and all those promoting the peace efforts. On 8 October 1991, Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar appointed Mr. Cyrus Vance, former United States Secretary of State, as his Personal Envoy for Yugoslavia.

As part of the collective effort to stop the fighting and to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, Mr. Vance undertook several missions to Yugoslavia and discussed with all parties concerned, among other things, the feasibility of deploying a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. On 23 November, the Personal Envoy convened in Geneva a meeting which was attended by the Presidents of Serbia and of Croatia and the Secretary of State for National Defence of Yugoslavia, as well as Lord Carrington, then Chairman of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia. During the meeting, the Yugoslav parties reached agreement on an immediate cease-fire and a number of other issues. Each of the Yugoslav parties expressed the wish to see the speedy establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation. However, while progress was made on the other issues, the cease-fire broke down almost immediately.

On 27 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 721 (1991), approved the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy. During subsequent weeks of intensive negotiations with the parties concerned, the implementation of the Geneva agreement was pursued and the general principles were defined for a United Nations peace-keeping operation. On 15 December, the Security Council, by its resolution 724 (1991), approved the Secretary-General's report which contained a plan for a possible peace-keeping operation. A small group of military officers, civilian police and United Nations Secretariat staff travelled to Yugoslavia to carry forward preparations for the implementation of this plan.

Thereafter the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy focused their efforts on consolidating the cease-fire and on securing unconditional acceptance of the United Nations plan by all parties to the conflict

including assurances of their readiness to cooperate fully in its implementation.

On 2 January 1992, the Personal Envoy convened, in Sarajevo, a meeting between military representatives of the Republic of Croatia and representatives of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), at which an Implementing Accord on the unconditional cease-fire was signed. With the Security Council's concurrence, newly-elected Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali then sent to Yugoslavia a group of military liaison officers, with the task of using their good offices to promote maintenance of the cease-fire. In the meantime, the Personal Envoy, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Mr. Marrack Goulding, and their team continued their efforts to secure the cooperation of all Yugoslav parties in implementing the United Nations plan for a peace-keeping operation.

Establishment of UNPROFOR

On 15 February 1992, notwithstanding the fact that certain political groups in Yugoslavia were still expressing objections to the United Nations plan, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council the establishment of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). On 21 February, the Security Council, by its resolution 743 (1992), approved the report and established UNPROFOR for an initial period of 12 months. The Council confirmed that the Force should be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis within the framework of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia.

Concept of Operations and Structure

UNPROFOR is deployed in three "United Nations Protected Areas" (UNPAs) in Croatia — Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina — which, for United Nations purposes, were divided into four sectors: East, North, South and West. The UNPAs are areas in which Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter-communal tensions have led to armed conflict in the recent past. The United Nations deployment plan rests on two central elements: the withdrawal of JNA from all of Croatia and the demilitarization of the UNPAs; and the continuing functioning, on an interim basis, of the existing local authorities and police, under United Nations supervision, pending the achievement of an overall political solution to the Yugoslav crisis.

As originally conceived, UNPROFOR's mandate is to ensure that the UNPAs are demilitarized, through the withdrawal or disbandment of all armed forces in them, and that all persons residing in them are protected from fear of armed attack. To this end, UNPROFOR is authorized to control access to the UNPAs, to ensure that the UNPAs remain demilitarized, and to monitor the functioning of the local police there to help ensure non-discrimination and the protection of human rights. Outside the UNPAs, UNPROFOR military observers are to verify the withdrawal of all JNA and irregular forces from Croatia, other than those disbanded and demobilized there. In support of the work of the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations, UNPROFOR will also facilitate the return, in conditions of safety and security, of civilian displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs. UNPROFOR initially established its headquarters in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina; it is now headquartered in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia.

Enlargements of UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia

Since the establishment of UNPROFOR, there were several enlargements of its mandate in Croatia — in June 1992, in accordance with Security Council resolution 762 (1992), to include monitoring of certain areas in Croatia (the so-called "pink zones") falling within the JNA lines and now populated largely by Serbs, but which were outside the agreed UNPA boundaries; in August, in accordance with resolution 769 (1992), to enable UNPROFOR to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform immigration and customs functions at the UNPA borders at international frontiers; and in October, in accordance with resolution 779 (1992), to include monitoring of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula near Dubrovnik. By the same resolution, the Council approved the Secretary-General's action to ensure the control by UNPROFOR of the vitally important Peruca dam, situated in one of the "pink zones" in Croatia.

UNPROFOR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Background

In April 1992, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina rapidly deteriorated. In a series of resolutions, the Security Council appealed to all parties to bring about a cease-fire and a negotiated political solution, and

demanded, *inter alia*, that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by JNA, as well as by the Croatian Army cease immediately and that all local irregular forces be disbanded and disarmed. In May, however, despite all diplomatic efforts by the European Community, the Secretary-General's representatives and UNPROFOR, the conflict continued to intensify. In order to focus on the implementation of its mandate in Croatia, the bulk of UNPROFOR's headquarters personnel withdrew from Sarajevo on 16 and 17 May, leaving behind some 100 military personnel and civilian staff who lent their good offices to promote local cease-fires and humanitarian activities.

On 30 May, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council, in its resolution *757* (1992), imposed wide-ranging sanctions on Yugoslavia (which by then consisted of Serbia and Montenegro), in order to help achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict. It also demanded that all parties create the conditions necessary for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue using his good offices to achieve this objective.

Security arrangements at Sarajevo airport

In keeping with the Council's request, UNPROFOR pursued negotiations with the parties to the conflict aimed at stopping the fighting around the airport and reopening it for humanitarian purposes. On 6 June, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that UNPROFOR had negotiated, on 5 June, an agreement for the handing over to the Force of Sarajevo airport. On 8 June, the Security Council approved the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength and authorized the Secretary-General to deploy military observers and related personnel and equipment to Sarajevo to supervise the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons and the concentration of heavy weapons at agreed locations in the city.

Following intensive work by UNPROFOR to establish modalities of implementation of the 5 June agreement, and a visit to Sarajevo by President François Mitterrand of France on 28 June, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council, on 29 June, that Bosnian Serb forces had been withdrawing from the Sarajevo airport, and both sides — the Serb and the Bosnia Presidential forces — had begun to concentrate their heavy weapons in locations to be supervised by UNPROFOR. On the same day, the Council, by resolution *761* (1992), authorized deployment of additional elements of UNPROFOR to ensure the security and functioning of the airport. By 3 July, despite continued fighting in the area, United Nations observers and troops were deployed at the airport and at other locations in Sarajevo, and the airport was reopened for the humanitarian airlift.

Protection of humanitarian convoys

On 13 August, the Security Council, deeply disturbed by the situation prevailing in Sarajevo, which severely complicated UNPROFOR's efforts to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, by resolution *770* (1992) and acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, called on States to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate, in coordination with the United Nations, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council also invited the Secretary-General to keep under continuous review any further measures that may be necessary to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies.

On 10 September, following consultations with a number of Governments, the Secretary-General submitted a further report to the Security Council recommending the expansion of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He proposed that UNPROFOR's task, under its enlarged mandate, would be to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular to provide protection, at UNHCR's request, where and when UNHCR considered such protection necessary. In addition, UNPROFOR could be used to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) so requested and if the Force Commander agreed that the request was practicable. UNPROFOR would be deployed in four or five new zones. In each zone there would be an infantry battalion group, whose headquarters would also include civilian staff to undertake political and information functions and liaison with UNHCR. UNPROFOR troops would follow normal peace-keeping rules of engagement, which authorize them to use force in self-defence, including situations in which

armed persons attempt by force to prevent them from carrying out their mandate.

On 14 September, the Security Council adopted its resolution 776 (1992) approving the Secretary-General's report and authorizing the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina for these purposes.

"No-fly zone"

In a further development, the Security Council, on 9 October, adopted its resolution 781 (1992) banning all military flights in the air space of Bosnia and Herzegovina, except for those of UNPROFOR and other flights in support of United Nations operations, including humanitarian assistance. The Council requested UNPROFOR to monitor compliance with the ban, and that it place observers, where necessary, at air fields in the former Yugoslavia. The Security Council further requested the Secretary-General to report periodically on the implementation of the ban and to report immediately any evidence of violations. It undertook to examine without delay all such information and to consider urgently further measures necessary to enforce the ban. On 10 November, the Security Council adopted its resolution 781 (1992) authorizing the expansion of UNPROFOR's strength by 75 military observers to enable it to monitor airfields in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Border control

On 16 November, the Security Council adopted its resolution 787 (1992), in which, among other things, it considered that, in order to facilitate the implementation of the relevant Council resolutions, observers should be deployed on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and requested the Secretary-General to present his recommendations on this matter. The resolutions in question are: resolution 713 (1991) which, *inter alia*, established a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia; resolution 752 (1992) which, *inter alia*, demanded that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by units of JNA as well as elements of the Croatian Army, cease immediately; resolution 757 (1992) which imposed comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and resolution 787 (1992) which, *inter alia*, demanded that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including infiltration into the country of irregular units and personnel, cease immediately.

On 21 December, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his recommendations. In the report, he indicated that in order to ensure compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, it would be necessary to give UNPROFOR a mandate which would include the right not only to search but also to turn back or confiscate military personnel, weapons, or sanctioned goods whose passage into or out of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be contrary to decisions of the Council. He pointed out that a symbolic presence at selected crossing points would "not only fail to fulfil the Council's requirements, but would also undermine the already strained credibility of UNPROFOR". He proposed, therefore, an enlargement of UNPROFOR with some 10,000 additional troops to provide for 24-hour observation and search operation at 123 crossing points on Bosnia and Herzegovina's border with neighbouring countries.

Peace talks

In the meantime, diplomatic efforts to bring peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina have proceeded on the basis of the principles of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, adopted at its London session in August 1992. The Co-Chairmen of the Conference's Steering Committee — the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, Mr. Vance, and Lord Owen, newly-appointed European Community mediator — held a series of talks with the parties concerned. The latest round of the peace talks was held in Geneva from 23 to 30 January 1993. The participants included the President of the Bosnian Government, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic; Mr. Radovan Karadzic, the leader of Bosnian Serbs; Mr. Mate Boban, the leader of Bosnian Croats; the President of the Republic of Croatia, Mr. Franjo Tudjman; and the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Mr. Dobrica Cosic. A further round of talks was scheduled to take place at United Nations Headquarters in February 1993.

UNPROFOR IN FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

On 11 November 1992, the President of Macedonia conveyed to the Secretary-General a request for the deployment of United Nations observers in Macedonia in view of his concern about possible impact on it of

fighting elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Such deployment was also recommended by Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. With the Security Council's approval, the Secretary-General sent to Macedonia from 28 November to 3 December a group of military, police and civilian personnel to assess the situation and prepare a report concerning a possible deployment of UNPROFOR in that country.

On 9 December, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report in which he recommended an expansion of the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR to establish a United Nations presence on Macedonia's borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). He indicated that the Force's mandate would be essentially preventive, to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia and threaten its territory. The Secretary-General recommended that the enlargement of UNPROFOR comprise an estimated one battalion of up to 700 all ranks, 35 military observers, 26 civilian police monitors, 10 civil affairs staff, 45 administrative staff and local interpreters. This contingent is to operate under UNPROFOR's "Macedonian Command" with headquarters in Skopje, capital of Macedonia. The Security Council, by its resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December, approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the establishment of UNPROFOR's presence in Macedonia.

RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Security Council Resolution 777

On 19 September 1992, the Security Council, by its resolution 777 (1992), considered that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) could not continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations. The Council recommended to the General Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly. The Council also decided to consider the matter again before the end of the main part of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly. On 22 September, the General Assembly, by its resolution 47/1, agreed with the Council's recommendation.

Commission of Experts

In a separate development, on 6 October 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 780 (1992) expressing its grave alarm at the continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The Council requested the Secretary-General to establish an impartial Commission of Experts "to examine and analyse the information submitted pursuant to resolution 771 (1992) and the present resolution, together with such information as the Commission of Experts may obtain through its own investigations or efforts, of other persons or bodies pursuant to resolution 771 (1992), with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia."

In a report dated 14 October 1992 to the Security Council, the Secretary-General announced his decision to establish a Commission of Experts to be composed of five members. On 23 October, the Secretary-General informed the Council that he had appointed the following five persons as the members of the Commission: Professor Fritz Kalshoven of the Netherlands (Chairman), Professor Cherif Bassiouni of Egypt, Mr. William Fenrick of Canada, Judge Keba Mbaye of Senegal, and Professor Torkel Opsahl of Norway.

COMPOSITION OF UNPROFOR

UNPROFOR includes military, police and civilian components comprising some 23,000 personnel.

In Croatia, the military and civilian police components of UNPROFOR comprise some 13,400 personnel, consisting of 12 infantry battalions (some 10,250 all ranks), 147 military observers, 564 civilian police monitors, and headquarters and support elements totalling some 2,500 all ranks.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the strength of UNPROFOR is approximately 9,200 personnel, including three infantry battalions (some 1,500 all ranks) in Sarajevo, four infantry battalion groups (about 6,000 all ranks) in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 122 military observers, 12 civilian police monitors, and headquarters and support units totalling approximately 1,530 all ranks.

UNPROFOR's Macedonia Command is to include some 760 personnel, consisting of one battalion of up to 700 all ranks, 35 military observers, and 26 civilian police monitors.

In addition, in accordance with Security Council resolution 786 (1992), monitoring of selected airfields in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is carried out by 76 military observers.

The military and/or civilian police personnel of UNPROFOR is provided by the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic/Slovak Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela.

The civilian component of the Force consists largely of staff members of the United Nations.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF UNPROFOR

The Secretary-General initially estimated that the cost to the United Nations associated with the emplacement and maintenance of UNPROFOR for the first twelve-month period would be over $600 million. The costs of the operation were to be met by assessed contributions from the United Nations Member States. However, the expansions to the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR referred to above will necessitate a significant upward revision of this figure.

In March 1992, the General Assembly appropriated an initial amount of $251.5 million for the expenses of the Force. The amount appropriated was believed to be adequate until October 1992, pending the Secretary-General's submission for additional requirements. In December 1992, the General Assembly decided to appropriate to the UNPROFOR Special Account an amount of $290 million for the period from 15 October 1992 to 20 February 1993. It also authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the operation of UNPROFOR at a rate not to exceed some $47 million per month for the period from 21 February to 20 September 1993, should the Security Council decide to continue the mission beyond 20 February 1993. As at 31 January 1993, contributions outstanding to the UNPROFOR Special Account for the period ending on 20 February 1993 amounted to approximately $282 million.

As far as the protection of humanitarian convoys in Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, military personnel, equipment and logistic support for UNPROFOR is currently provided at no cost to the United Nations by the contributing countries.

UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA

LOCATION: Cambodia

HEADQUARTERS: Phnom Penh

DURATION: March 1992 - to date

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: Some 22,000 military and civilian personnel

FATALITIES: 26

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HEAD OF MISSION: Mr. Yasushi Akashi (Japan)

FORCE COMMANDER: Lieutenant-General John M. Sanderson (Australia)

BACKGROUND

The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict was signed in Paris on 23 October 1991, at the final meeting of the Paris Conference on Cambodia. It was the culmination of more than a decade of negotiations in which the United Nations had been closely involved from the outset. The Agreement, also known as the Paris Agreement, invited the Security Council to establish the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and to provide it with the mandate set forth in the Agreement. The Council fully supported the Paris Agreement in its resolution 718 (1991) of 31 October 1991, and requested the Secretary-General to prepare a detailed plan of implementation.

Under the Agreement, the Supreme National Council of Cambodia (the SNC) is "the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined". The SNC, which is made up of the four Cambodian factions and is under the chairmanship of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, has delegated to the United Nations "all powers necessary" to ensure the implementation of the Agreement.

The mandate given to UNTAC under the Agreement includes aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, and the rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period. The transitional period commenced with the entry into force of the Agreement (23 October 1991) and is to terminate when the constituent assembly elected in conformity with the Agreement has approved the new Cambodian Constitution and transformed itself into a legislative assembly, and thereafter a new Cambodian Government has been created.

Prior to the establishment and deployment of UNTAC, the Secretary-General had recommended, on 30 September 1991, that the United Nations deploy a small advance mission in Cambodia to assist the Cambodian parties to maintain the cease-fire. Based on this recommendation, the Security Council, by its resolution 717 (1991) of 16 October 1991, decided to establish the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) immediately after the signing of the Agreement. UNAMIC became operational on 9 November 1991. It consisted of civilian and military liaison staff, a military mine-awareness unit, and logistics and support personnel. On 8 January 1992, by its resolution 728 (1992), the Council expanded the mandate of UNAMIC to include training in mine-clearance for Cambodians and the initiation of a mine-clearance programme.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNTAC

On 19 February 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report containing his proposed implementation plan. The Council approved that report and, by its resolution 745 (1992) of 28 February, established UNTAC under its authority for a

period not to exceed 18 months. Upon becoming operational on 15 March 1992, UNTAC absorbed UNAMIC.

UNTAC consists of seven distinct components with responsibilities in the fields of human rights, electoral activities, military, civil administration, civilian police, repatriation and rehabilitation. UNTAC is headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Yasushi Akashi.

EARLY DIFFICULTIES

Following an April 1992 visit to Cambodia, the Secretary-General, in his first progress report, informed the Security Council that although there were some delays in deployment, UNTAC had begun to establish itself both politically and militarily. On 9 May, UNTAC announced that Phase II of the cease-fire (the cantonment, disarming and demobilization phase) would begin on 13 June. However, following the announcement, it became clear that, of the four Cambodian parties — the Party of the State of Cambodia (SOC), the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) — PDK was not cooperating. In fact, PDK refused to allow UNTAC forces to proceed with their deployment in the areas under its control and did not provide the necessary information on the number of its troops and *matériel* in compliance with the Paris Agreement. In explanation of its position, PDK introduced its own interpretation of the provisions of the Paris Agreement relating to the verification of the withdrawal and non-return of foreign forces, and to the role and powers of the SNC.

In a 12 June special report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that, despite the lack of cooperation from PDK, he had concluded that Phase II must proceed as scheduled on 13 June. In his view, any delay would result in a loss of momentum and would jeopardize UNTAC's ability to organize and conduct elections as scheduled. The Council endorsed the Secretary-General's position and called upon all parties to comply strictly with the commitments they had accepted, including cooperation with UNTAC.

Following another Secretary-General's report, dated 14 July, the Security Council, by resolution 766 (1992) of 21 July, approved the efforts of the Secretary-General to continue implementing the Paris Agreement, and demanded that PDK implement Phase II of the cease-fire as well as other aspects of the Agreement. It also requested the Secretary-General to ensure that international assistance to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia from then on benefit only the parties which are fulfilling their obligations under the Agreement and cooperating fully with UNTAC.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADHERES TO THE TIMETABLE

On 21 September 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his second progress report on the activities of UNTAC, in which he stated that, despite the continuing refusal of PDK to grant UNTAC access to the zones it controls or to commit its forces to cantonment, the implementation of the mission was proceeding apace in other respects.

The Secretary-General pointed out that having carefully reviewed what UNTAC had accomplished so far, as well as the obstacles it had faced, he remained determined that the electoral process should be carried out in accordance with the implementation timetable. At the same time, the Secretary-General stated that the persistent failure of PDK to meet its obligations and the consequent drift in the peace process could not be allowed to continue. The Secretary-General indicated his intention, subject to Security Council approval, to request the co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference (the Foreign Ministers of France and Indonesia) to undertake consultations with the aim of finding a way out of the impasse.

On 13 October, the Security Council, by its resolution 783 (1992), approved the Secretary-General's second progress report and confirmed that the electoral process should proceed as scheduled. The Council, *inter alia*, demanded that PDK fulfil immediately its obligations under the Paris Agreement, and invited the Governments of Japan and Thailand, which had been actively involved in finding solutions to the current problems, to continue their efforts and to report the results to the Secretary-General and the co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference. The Council also invited the Secretary-General to ask the co-Chairmen immediately on receipt of that report to undertake appropriate consultations with a view to implementing fully the peace process. It requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council, no later than 15 November 1992, on the implementation of resolution 783.

CANTONMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS IS SUSPENDED

As requested by the Security Council, the Secretary-General submitted his report on 15 November 1992. He informed the Council that despite intensive efforts undertaken successively by Japan and Thailand and by the co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference, PDK continued its non-compliance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement.

In the report, the Secretary-General stated that due to the difficulties encountered in implementing Phase II of the cease-fire, the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization process had been effectively suspended. He also pointed to the cease-fire violations and increased tension in the central and northern parts of Cambodia following artillery exchanges. In addition, UNTAC personnel and helicopters were coming under attack in areas where the forces of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) were known to be present.

Nevertheless, the Secretary-General continued to believe that the peace process must continue and that the elections must be held as scheduled. He stated that UNTAC would continue "active dialogue" with PDK in an effort to meet the party's concerns and persuade it to comply with its obligations under the Paris Agreement. The various components of UNTAC would pursue implementation of their respective mandates, giving high priority to creating and maintaining a neutral political environment.

On 30 November, the Security Council adopted its resolution 792 (1992) endorsing the Secretary-General's report and confirming that the elections for a constituent assembly in Cambodia would be held no later than May 1993. It condemned PDK for failing to comply with its obligations and demanded, *inter alia*, that it facilitate full deployment of UNTAC in the areas under its control, and not impede voter registration or the activities of other political parties in those areas. Among other things, the Council invited UNTAC to establish all necessary border checkpoints, as recommended by the Secretary-General, in order to verify the withdrawal and non-return of foreign forces and the cessation of outside military assistance to the Cambodian parties. It also called for measures to prevent the supply of petroleum products from reaching areas occupied by any Cambodian party not complying with the military provisions of the Paris Agreement.

FURTHER CHALLENGES

In his third progress report on UNTAC activities, dated 25 January 1993, the Secretary-General noted a number of encouraging developments, including a "remarkable success" in the voter registration and the progress of the repatriation process.

However, UNTAC's efforts to create and maintain a neutral political environment needed for the holding of elections were seriously hampered by a number of negative developments. The refusal of PDK to participate fully in the peace process had meant the effective suspension of the cantonment, disarming and demobilization of the armed forces of the four factions, with the result that those forces remained under arms in the field. Cease-fire violations had increased, and tension had risen in some parts of the country.

Over the preceding few months, a spate of violent incidents — politically motivated attacks on political party offices and staff, attacks on Vietnamese-speaking persons, and killings having no particular political motivation — had also heightened a sense of insecurity among Cambodians.

In addition to investigating these incidents, UNTAC's Civilian Police, Military, and Civil Administration Components, together with the Human Rights Component, have developed measures, including intensive patrols and static guard duty, to prevent and deal with threats to public order. On 6 January 1993, the Special Representative issued a directive establishing procedures for the prosecution of persons responsible for human rights violations; as a result, UNTAC assumed powers to arrest, detain and prosecute suspects in cases of serious violations.

Since December 1992, there have been several incidents of temporary detention of or attacks on UNTAC personnel in PDK-controlled areas. At the same time, the Secretary-General reported, there seemed to be a growing reluctance on the part of some of the existing administrative structures in Cambodia to accept the control and supervision functions entrusted to UNTAC.

UNTAC ACTIVITIES

Despite all the difficulties that emerged in the implementation of the cantonment and demobilization process, UNTAC continued to make progress in implementing other aspects of its mandate.

Human Rights Component

Function. The Paris Agreement gives UNTAC the responsibility during the transitional period for fostering an environment in which respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is ensured and where free and fair elections may take place.

Activities. UNTAC Human Rights Component has been active in three broad areas. First, it has encouraged the SNC to adhere to relevant international human rights instruments and has undertaken a review of the existing judicial and penal systems in the light of international provisions. Secondly, it conducts an extensive human rights information and education campaign in close co-operation with the Information/Education Division of UNTAC. Thirdly, it continues to investigate human rights-related complaints and takes corrective measures where necessary.

On 20 April 1992, the SNC ratified the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. On 10 September, it agreed to accede to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

By early October, human rights officers had been deployed in all 21 provinces in Cambodia, including in the zones controlled by FUNCINPEC and KPNLF. However, the Component has no access to the zones controlled by PDK.

Electoral Component

Function. The elections are the focal point of the comprehensive settlement in Cambodia. The Paris Agreement entrusts UNTAC with the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections, scheduled to be held no later than May 1993. Under the Agreement, the election of 120 members to the constituent assembly will be held throughout Cambodia on a provincial basis in accordance with a system of proportional representation.

UNTAC is responsible for designing and implementing a system for every phase of the electoral process, starting with the establishment, in consultation with the SNC, of a legal framework including electoral law and regulations governing the electoral process and an electoral code of conduct. Other aspects of UNTAC activities include civic education and training, registration of voters and political parties, and the polling process itself.

Activities. The Electoral Law, which had been submitted by UNTAC on 1 April 1992, was adopted by the SNC on 5 August and was promulgated on 12 August. The registration of political parties began on 15 August, and, on 27 January 1993, 20 of the 22 provisionally registered political parties applied for official registration.

The voter registration, which began on 5 October 1992 initially for a three-month period, was subsequently extended. When it ended on 31 January 1993, over 4.6 million Cambodians had been registered, representing nearly all the estimated eligible voters in the zones to which UNTAC then had access.

On 28 January, the SNC agreed that the elections for the constituent assembly be held from 23 to 25 May 1993. It is foreseen that, during this period, there will be voting at fixed polling stations. UNTAC anticipates, however, that two additional days of voting at mobile polling stations will be required in order to ensure that every registered voter has the chance to vote. Therefore, polling will continue through 27 May.

Prince Sihanouk informed the SNC on 28 January 1993 that a presidential election should be held not in conjunction with the elections for the constituent assembly but after the adoption of the new Cambodian Constitution.

Military Component

Function. The Military Component of UNTAC, headed by a Force Commander, is charged with the following main functions: verification of the withdrawal from Cambodia and non-return of all categories of foreign forces and their arms and equipment; supervision of the cease-fire and related measures, including regroupment, cantonment, disarming and demobilization of forces of the Cambodian parties; weapons control, including monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance, locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia, storing of the arms and equipment of the cantoned and the demobilized military forces; and assisting with mine-clearance, including training programmes and mine-awareness programmes. In addition, the Component is to undertake investigations of alleged non-compliance with any of the provisions relating to military arrangements. It is also called upon to provide assistance in relation to the release of prisoners-of-war and

in repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons.

Activities. The Military Component has established a number of checkpoints on Cambodia's border with Viet Nam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Thailand. Checkpoints have also been established at the airports and at the port of Sihanoukville, as well as on major routes within the country. These checkpoints give UNTAC the capacity to observe activities in zones controlled by FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and SOC. This is supplemented by regular patrols. In addition, in accordance with Security Council resolution 792 (1992), consultations were held between UNTAC and the Government of Thailand regarding the establishment and operation of additional checkpoints along the Thai border in the areas controlled by PDK.

According to information provided by the four Cambodian parties, their regular military forces totalled over 200,000 deployed in some 650 locations. In addition, militias, totalling some 250,000, operated throughout the country. Although UNTAC had cantoned by mid-November 1992 some 55,000 troops of the three cooperating factions, the refusal of PDK to participate fully in the peace process made it impossible to implement Phase II of the cease-fire and, as a result, the cantonment, disarming and demobilization of the armed forces of the four factions have been suspended.

Under these circumstances, the Secretary-General proposed that the current level of deployment of the Military Component be maintained until the elections, and that the Component focus its attention on enhancing UNTAC's ability to protect voter registration and, subsequently, on the electoral and polling processes, particularly in remote or insecure areas. The original deployment pattern has been realigned to conform with the deployment, and ensuring the security, of electoral teams. In addition, the Component assists in UNTAC's efforts to promote a neutral political environment in Cambodia.

UNTAC has continued to devote serious attention to the question of the possible presence of foreign forces in Cambodia. To date, however, UNTAC has not found evidence of the presence of any formed units of such forces in areas to which it has access. Also, the Military Component has initiated the training of members of the four Cambodian parties in mine-clearance.

Civil Administration Component

Function. In order to ensure a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair general elections, UNTAC is to exercise direct control over existing administrative structures acting in the field of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information. UNTAC is to exercise, as determined in consultation with the SNC, a lesser degree of scrutiny over other administrative structures that could influence the outcome of the elections.

Activities. On 1 July 1992, the Civil Administration Component began to exercise full control over the five key areas in the Phnom Penh administration, as specified in the Paris Agreement: foreign affairs, national defence, public security, finance and information. By 15 July, UNTAC civil administration offices had been established in all 21 provinces. Like the other Components of UNTAC, civil administration personnel have so far been denied access to the PDK-controlled areas.

In addition, UNTAC has established optional control over those organs dealing with public health, education, agriculture, maritime and riverine fisheries, communications and postal services, energy production and distribution, navigable waters and public transport, tourism and historical monuments, mines, and general administration.

In accordance with the implementation plan, the Civil Administration Component requested the four Cambodian parties to submit a list of their current laws for review by UNTAC. With the exception of PDK, all parties complied. At the initiative of UNTAC, the SNC, at its meetings on 20 April and 5 June 1992, adopted laws enshrining the rights of freedom of association and of assembly. On 10 September, the SNC also approved a set of principles relating to the legal system, penal law and penal procedure.

Civilian Police Component

Function. UNTAC civilian police monitors are to supervise or control the local civil police in order to ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected.

Activities. By the end of December 1992, the UNTAC Civilian Police Component had reached almost full deployment of its personnel, about 60 to 65 per cent of which were assisting in the voter registration process. The Component operates in Phnom Penh and at the provincial and district level. It also conducts regular patrols in villages.

UNTAC provides the local police with training in basic police methods and traffic-control procedures. Special instruction is also given to police officers and

judges in the implementation of the new penal code. The Component's duties also include directing the efforts of the local police force against the growing problem of banditry in the interior. It participates, in cooperation with the Military Component, in supervising the checkpoints and patrols of the existing police forces in sensitive areas. The Component also assists in promoting a neutral political environment in Cambodia.

Repatriation Component

Function. It is anticipated that some 90 per cent of the estimated 360,000 refugees and displaced persons will repatriate under United Nations auspices. The repatriation and resettlement is an inter-agency effort under the overall authority of UNTAC. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which acts as the lead agency, oversees the movement of returnees, the provision of immediate assistance and food, and a reintegration programme. The Repatriation Component of UNTAC is headed by a Director, appointed by the Secretary-General and reporting to the Special Representative as well as to the High Commissioner for Refugees.

Activities. Since the repatriation exercise began on 30 March 1992, over 300,000 refugees and displaced persons have returned to Cambodia under United Nations auspices. The remainder is expected to be repatriated by the beginning of April 1993.

The programme of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), jointly managed with the United Nations Development Programme, has been introduced and is progressing successfully. The main areas of activity are infrastructure, health, provision of water, agriculture and education.

Despite efforts to diversify the options for the returnees — such as offering them cash instead of land and building materials — the shortage of available and safe land continues to raise concern. The slow pace of mine-clearing and continuing disputes over land ownership contribute to the scarcity of land, which is compounded in some parts of the country by the prevalence of banditry and malaria.

On 10 June 1992, the SNC, at the initiative of UNTAC, established a Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), a non-profit Cambodian institution, to carry out programmes in mine-awareness, mine-marking, mine-clearing and related training. In July 1992, UNHCR signed with the non-governmental organization Handicap International an agreement that provides for the recruitment of Cambodian mine-clearance personnel trained and supervised by UNTAC.

Rehabilitation Component

Function. The Rehabilitation Component of UNTAC focuses on food security, health, housing, training, education, the transport network and the restoration of the basic infrastructure, including public utilities. The Component's Director coordinates rehabilitation activities, and makes ongoing assessments of needs. In addition, the Director has responsibilities related to raising resources through donor contributions.

Activities. Shortly after the establishment of UNTAC, a Technical Advisory Committee of the SNC was set up under the chairmanship of the UNTAC Director of Rehabilitation in order to facilitate the approval of projects with the consensus of the four parties. While PDK initially refused to cooperate with the work of the Committee, it subsequently modified its stance. At the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, held in Tokyo in June 1992, the international community pledged nearly $880 million in aid to Cambodia. By the end of January 1993, 42 projects representing over $360 million had been approved by the SNC.

In the area of Cambodia's natural resources management, the SNC, on the recommendation of the Technical Advisory Committee, instituted, on 22 September 1992, a country-wide moratorium on the export of logs from Cambodia, a decision supported by the Security Council in its resolution 792 (1992) of 30 November. In addition, the SNC agreed that a similar moratorium on the export of minerals and gems should take effect as from 28 February 1993.

Information/Education Activities

The Information/Education Division of UNTAC is engaged in informing the Cambodians of the essence of the Paris Agreement and UNTAC's role, objectives and activities. After two decades of fighting and isolation, many Cambodians are sceptical about the applicability in Cambodia of basic concepts of human rights, including free and fair elections and multiparty political campaigning. The flow of information between UNTAC and the grass roots, therefore, is essential to the implementation by UNTAC of its mandate.

UNTAC has established its own radio station and, on 9 November 1992, it began broadcasting from a Phnom Penh-based transmitter loaned by SOC for UNTAC's exclusive use. The broadcasts concentrate

on information regarding voter registration and the electoral process, but also feature human rights and other aspects of the UNTAC mandate. Other activities of the Division include the production of audio-visual material, which is distributed throughout the country by UNTAC military, police and civilian personnel.

COMPOSITION OF UNTAC

UNTAC's strength varies according to the phase of operations, with over 22,000 military and civilian personnel present at the peak time. UNTAC military and/or civilian police personnel, which currently number more than 19,200 all ranks, are provided by Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay. Other Components of UNTAC consist largely of staff members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, as well as those seconded from Member States. In addition, UNTAC international staff is supplemented by locally recruited staff.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The total cost of UNAMIC and UNTAC for the period from 1 November 1991 to 31 July 1993 has been estimated at approximately $1,600 million. Initially, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of some $840 million for the expenses of UNAMIC and UNTAC, through 31 October 1992. On 22 December 1992, the General Assembly decided to appropriate a further amount of some $484 million for the continued UNTAC operation for the period from 1 November 1992 to 30 April 1993. As for the period from 1 May to 31 July 1993, the Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments at a rate not exceeding approximately $242 million. As at 31 January 1993, contributions outstanding to the UNAMIC and UNTAC Special Accounts for the period ending on 30 April 1993 amounted to approximately $409 million.

Repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, as well as rehabilitation assistance, are funded from voluntary contributions. At the June 1992 Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, some $880 million was pledged for these activities.

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA

LOCATION: Somalia

HEADQUARTERS: Mogadishu

DURATION: April 1992 - to date

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 50 military observers, 3,500 security personnel, up to 719 logistic support personnel and some 200 international civilian staff

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. Ismat Kittani (Iraq)
(Mr. Kittani is to be succeeded by Admiral Jonathan T. Howe of the United States, effective 9 March 1993)

FORCE COMMANDER: Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen (Pakistan)
(General Shaheen is to be succeeded in March 1993 by Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir of Turkey as Force Commander of UNOSOM II)

BACKGROUND

The downfall of President Siad Barre in January 1991 resulted in a power struggle and clan clashes in many parts of Somalia. In November, the most intense fighting since January broke out in the capital, Mogadishu, between two factions — one supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other supporting the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Aidid. Since then, fighting persisted in Mogadishu and spread throughout Somalia, with heavily armed elements controlling various parts of the country. Some declared alliance with one or the other of the two factions, while others did not. Numerous marauding groups of bandits added to the problem.

The hostilities resulted in widespread death and destruction, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes and causing a dire need for emergency humanitarian assistance. Almost 4.5 million people in Somalia — over half of the estimated population — were threatened by severe malnutrition and malnutrition-related disease, with the most affected living in the countryside. It is estimated that perhaps 300,000 people died since November 1991, and at least 1.5 million lives were at immediate risk. Almost one million Somalis sought refuge in neighbouring countries and elsewhere. In Kenya alone, over 300,000 Somalis have taken refuge during the past 18 months.

The political chaos, deteriorating security situation, widespread banditry and looting, and extent of physical destruction compounded the problem and severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Furthermore, the conflict threatened stability in the Horn of Africa region, and its continuation occasioned threats to international peace and security in the area.

EARLY UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS

Despite the turmoil that ensued after the overthrow of President Siad Barre, the United Nations continued its humanitarian efforts in Somalia and, by March 1991, was fully engaged in that country. Over the following months, the volatile security situation forced the United Nations on several occasions to temporarily withdraw its personnel from Somalia, but it continued its humanitarian activities to the fullest extent possible, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The deteriorating and appalling situation in Somalia led the United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), to become actively involved with the political aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

On 27 December 1991, then Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar informed the President of the Security Council that he intended to take an initiative in an attempt to restore peace in Somalia. Accordingly, after consulting the incoming Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he had asked Under-Secretary-General

for Political Affairs, Mr. James O.C. Jonah to visit the area.

In early January 1992, despite continued fighting in Mogadishu, Mr. Jonah led a team of senior United Nations officials into Somalia for talks aimed at bringing about a cessation of hostilities and securing access by the international relief community to civilians caught in the conflict. During that visit, support for a cease-fire in Mogadishu was expressed by all faction leaders, except General Aidid. Unanimous support was expressed, however, for a United Nations role in bringing about national reconciliation.

The results of the visit were reported to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who then consulted with the members of the Security Council on the appropriate course of action. On 23 January, by its resolution 733 (1992), the Security Council urged all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, and decided that all States should immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. The Council requested the Secretary-General to increase humanitarian assistance to the affected population, and to contact all parties involved in the conflict, to seek their commitment to the cessation of hostilities, to promote a cease-fire and to assist in the process of a political settlement of the conflict.

On 31 January, the Secretary-General invited LAS, OAU and OIC, as well as Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid to send their representatives to participate in consultations at United Nations Headquarters on 12-14 February. The talks succeeded in getting the two factions in Mogadishu to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of the cease-fire, and to a visit to Mogadishu by a joint high-level delegation composed of representatives of the United Nations and the three regional organizations to conclude a cease-fire.

The joint delegation arrived in Mogadishu on 29 February 1992. On 3 March, after four days of intensive negotiations, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed an "Agreement on the Implementation of a Cease-fire". This Agreement also included the acceptance of a United Nations security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance, and the deployment of 20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the cease-fire. At the same time, the joint delegation undertook consultations regarding a national reconciliation conference to which all Somali groups would be invited.

On 17 March, the Security Council adopted its resolution 746 (1992) supporting the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch to Somalia a technical team to prepare a plan for a cease-fire monitoring mechanism. The Council also requested that the team develop a high-priority plan to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The team visited Somalia from 23 March to 1 April. Following discussions with the team, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed on 28 and 27 March 1992, respectively, Letters of Agreement on the mechanisms for monitoring the cease-fire and on arrangements for equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNOSOM

On 24 April 1992, in response to a recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council adopted resolution 751 (1992), by which it decided to establish a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The Council also asked the Secretary-General, in cooperation with LAS, OAU and OIC, to pursue consultations with all Somali parties toward convening a conference on national reconciliation and unity. It also called on the international community for financial and other support for the Secretary-General's 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia. The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's intention to appoint a Special Representative for Somalia to provide overall direction of United Nations activities in that country. Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun of Algeria was appointed Special Representative on 28 April and left for the area on 1 May.

UNOSOM'S ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

In accordance with the agreements reached with the two main Somali factions in Mogadishu, the cease-fire in the capital was to be monitored by a group of 50 unarmed uniformed United Nations military observers. As regards humanitarian assistance, the security personnel envisaged in the agreements was to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the sea- and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in the city and its immediate environs.

In its resolution 751 (1992), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to deploy immediately 50 observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu. It also agreed, in principle, to establish a security force

to be deployed as soon as possible. In this regard, the Council requested the Secretary-General to continue his consultations with the parties in Mogadishu regarding the proposed security force.

On 23 June, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that both principal factions in Mogadishu had agreed to the immediate deployment of the unarmed observers. The Chief Military Observer and the advance party of UNOSOM observers arrived in Mogadishu in early July 1992. On 12 August, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, after considerable delays and difficulties, agreement had been reached with the principal faction leaders in Mogadishu to deploy 500 United Nations security personnel in the capital as part of UNOSOM. The first group of security personnel arrived in Mogadishu on 14 September 1992.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Between 4 May and 19 July 1992, the Secretary-General's Special Representative undertook extensive consultations with various Somali leaders and Elders and other personalities throughout the country. On 22 July, the Secretary-General reported to the Council on the complex political and security situation in Somalia, as well as the desperate situation the country faced in terms of needs for humanitarian assistance, recovery programmes and institution-building. The Secretary-General concluded that the United Nations must "adapt" its involvement in Somalia and that its efforts needed to be enlarged in order to bring about an effective cease-fire throughout the country, while at the same time promoting national reconciliation.

On 27 July, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report and urged all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate United Nations efforts to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population. The Council strongly supported the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch another technical team to Somalia.

ENLARGEMENT OF UNOSOM

Following the technical team's visit to Somalia on 6 – 15 August, the Secretary-General submitted his further report, dated 24 August, to the Security Council, in which he described a number of urgent steps, being planned or already taken, to mitigate the widespread starvation in the areas of Somalia most seriously affected by the civil war and drought and to prevent the incidence of hunger escalating in other parts of the country. Having said that the United Nations and its partners were ready and had the capacity to provide substantially increased assistance, the Secretary-General stated that they were prevented from doing so by the lawlessness and lack of security prevailing throughout Somalia. Looting, by heavily armed gangs, of supplies from delivery and distribution points, as well as attacks on the incoming and docked ships and on airports and airstrips, prevented the assured delivery of humanitarian assistance by overland transport.

The Secretary-General recommended the deployment of four additional United Nations security units, each with a strength of up to 750, to protect the humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia. Also, in accordance with his earlier proposal, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of four zone headquarters of UNOSOM.

On 28 August, the Security Council, by its resolution 775 (1992), approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the increase in strength of UNOSOM. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue, in close cooperation with LAS, OAU and OIC, his efforts to seek a comprehensive solution to the crisis in Somalia.

100-DAY ACTION PROGRAMME

There have been six main United Nations organizations at work in Somalia coordinating overall humanitarian efforts: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, more than 30 NGOs have been working in Somalia as "implementing partners" of the United Nations. Moreover, the ICRC has continued to provide assistance under the most difficult of situations. There are also many local NGOs that work with the United Nations and the international NGOs.

Between 10 and 12 September 1992, as part of the overall effort to accelerate humanitarian relief activities, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Jan Eliasson, led a high-level inter-agency mission to Somalia. A major outcome of the mission was the decision to develop a 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance, for the period until the end of 1992. The 100-Day Programme was reviewed at the First Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Soma-

lia, held at Geneva on 12 and 13 October 1992 under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia.

From 3 to 5 December 1992, the Secretary-General convened the Second Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, at the Conference Centre of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to review the implementation of the 100-Day Action Programme. The discussion at the meeting also went beyond the scope of the Action Programme to address further relief activities, as well as the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia. One of the conclusions of the meeting was that 100-Day Programme should be followed by a new plan for 1993. Subsequently, it was decided that a United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia would be held in Addis Ababa in March 1993 to review the Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for 1993 and receive pledges from donors.

SITUATION DETERIORATES

In October and November 1992, despite all efforts by the international community, the United Nations Secretary-General and his new Special Representative for Somalia, Mr. Ismat Kittani,* the situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate. Somalia remained without a central government with which to negotiate. Mogadishu was divided by rival militias. Throughout the country, a dozen or more factions — some rent by internal divisions — were active. The resulting political chaos and the extensive physical destruction severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Widespread looting of aid supplies, robbery, armed banditry, and general lawlessness compounded the situation.

Several of the Somali de facto authorities refused to agree to the deployment of United Nations troops to secure delivery of aid in areas of greatest need. UNOSOM troops in Mogadishu were fired upon and their vehicles and arms taken. Relief ships were blocked from docking, threatened and even shelled. Air- and seaports came under fire. Large sums of cash and relief aid were being extorted from donor agencies and organizations, and the lives of their personnel attempting to distribute supplies to starving people were being put into danger.

The net result was that, while relief supplies were ready and in the pipeline, only a trickle was reaching those in need. According to some estimates, as many as 3,000 persons a day were dying of starvation in Somalia, while warehouses remained stocked. Unless the problems relating to security and protection of relief supplies were resolved, it was believed that United Nations agencies and NGOs would be unable to provide the assistance in the amounts and on the urgent basis needed.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUGGESTS FIVE OPTIONS

In a letter to the Security Council on 24 November 1992, the Secretary-General reported on the deteriorating situation in Somalia, with particular reference to the factors preventing UNOSOM from implementing its mandate. The Secretary-General stated that he did not exclude the possibility that it might become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort there. He cited the lack of government in Somalia, the failure of various factions to cooperate with UNOSOM, the extortion, blackmail and robbery to which the international relief effort was subjected and the repeated attacks on the personnel and equipment of the United Nations and other relief agencies.

The members of the Council discussed the Secretary-General's letter during informal consultations on 25 November. They expressed the view that the situation in Somalia was intolerable and asked the Secretary-General to present specific recommendations on how the United Nations could remedy the present situation.

In response, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a further letter, dated 29 November, in which he outlined, for the Council's consideration, five options for creating conditions for the uninterrupted delivery of supplies to the starving people of Somalia. The Secretary-General also informed the Council of a visit he received on 25 November from Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, then Acting Secretary of State of the United States, who indicated that, should the Security Council decide to authorize Member States to ensure the delivery of relief supplies, the United States would be ready to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in which a number of other Member States would also participate.

According to the Secretary-General's letter, the first option would be to continue and intensify efforts to deploy UNOSOM in accordance with its existing mandate. The second option suggested that the idea of using international military personnel to protect relief

* Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Ismat Kittani (Iraq) as his Special Representative for Somalia on 3 November 1992, to replace Mohammed Sahnoun who had resigned.

activities be abandoned, and that humanitarian agencies make the best arrangements they could with the various faction and clan leaders. However, the Secretary-General considered neither of these two options to be an adequate response to the crisis.

As to the other three options, the Secretary-General stated that their purpose would be to ensure, on a lasting basis, that the current violence against the international relief effort was brought to an end.

The first of those three would be for UNOSOM troops to undertake a show of force in Mogadishu in an attempt to discourage those abusing the relief efforts. However, he contended that a countrywide operation would be required to have the desired deterrent effect.

The next option would entail a countrywide action by a group of Member States authorized to do so by the Security Council. The Secretary-General mentioned in this connection the offer by the United States to organize and lead such an operation. In such a case, the Secretary-General would advise the Council and those Members taking part in the operation that they find a way to recognize the Security Council's legitimate interest in the manner in which it was carried out.

The remaining option was also for a countrywide enforcement action, but one carried out under United Nations command and control. This would be consistent, he stated, with the recent enlargement of the Organization's role in the maintenance of international peace and security, and would strengthen its long-term evolution as an effective system of collective security. However, the United Nations Secretariat did not currently have the capability to command and control an enforcement operation of the size required. The Secretary-General concluded that there was no alternative but to resort to the enforcement provisions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

The Secretary-General stressed that whether an action was taken under United Nations command, or by Member States with Security Council authorization, it should be precisely defined and limited in time, "in order to prepare the way for a return to peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building".

THE SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES THE USE OF FORCE

On 3 December, the Security Council adopted, unanimously, its resolution 794 (1992), authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized the Secretary-General and the participating Member States to make arrangements for "the unified command and control" of the military forces that would be involved. It called on all Member States that were in a position to do so to provide military forces and to make contributions in cash or in kind, and requested the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the contributions could be appropriately channelled to the States or operations concerned.

The Security Council requested the Secretary-General and Member States contributing troops to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and their military forces, and invited the Secretary-General to attach a small liaison staff of UNOSOM to the field headquarters of the unified command. Further, the Council requested the Secretary-General and the States concerned to report regularly to it on the progress in establishing a secure environment in Somalia. It requested the Secretary-General to submit a plan to ensure that UNOSOM would be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command.

As to the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Somalia, the Security Council decided that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel of UNOSOM, authorized by resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August, should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground.

UNIFIED TASK FORCE IS DEPLOYED

The first elements of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), spearheaded by the United States,* were deployed in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992. By 16 December, Phase I of the operation was completed as UNITAF reported that airfield and port facilities at Mogadishu and the airfields in Bale Dogle and Baidoa were secure. Phase II was completed on 28 December with the securing of all eight major relief centres to include Kismayo, Bardera, Oddur, Gialalassi and Belet Weyne. Phase III, now under way, will be completed when security for land movement of relief supplies from seaports to interior relief centres has been established. UNITAF also continues to expand security operations in the countryside.

UNITAF's principal goal in Somalia is to establish a secure environment for urgent humanitarian assistance. Once that is accomplished, the military com-

* In addition to the United States forces, UNITAF currently includes military units from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

mand will then be turned over to the United Nations. Meanwhile, UNOSOM remains fully responsible for the political aspects and for humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Good coordination on the ground and at United Nations Headquarters has been established between the UNITAF and the United Nations. UNOSOM remains in the capital, and continues to liaise with UNITAF and plan for the transition to normal peace-keeping functions.

On 19 December, the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a report, in which he described actions taken to implement resolution 794 (1992) and set out his thinking on a new mandate for UNOSOM and the transition from UNITAF to continued peace-keeping operations. The Secretary-General recommended that the Council defer its decision on such a transition until it became clear whether UNITAF had achieved its goal. He suggested that it should await the establishment of a cease-fire, the control of heavy weapons, the disarming of lawless gangs and the creation of a new police force.

In his further report to the Security Council, dated 26 January 1992, the Secretary-General congratulated UNITAF for rapidly and successfully securing major population centres and ensuring that humanitarian assistance is delivered and distributed without impediment. As to UNOSOM, he indicated that its major preoccupation at the present juncture was the planning for the transition from the operations of UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The planning exercise, the Secretary-General pointed out, is proceeding smoothly in close cooperation and consultation with the Command of UNITAF.

SEEKING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

In the meantime, the Secretary-General convened an informal preparatory meeting at ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa on 4 – 15 January 1993, for a national reconciliation conference envisaged under United Nations auspices. A total of 14 Somali political movements took part in the meeting, along with the Secretaries-General of LAS, OAU, OIC and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn, as well as the representatives of the current Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

The following three agreements were concluded and signed at the meeting: (a) General Agreement of 8 January 1993; (b) Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament; and, (c) Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to help resolve the criteria for participation at, and the agenda for, the national reconciliation conference as well as any other issues pending from the informal meeting. Among other things, the informal meeting agreed on the convening of a national reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993. The Somali parties requested the United Nations, in consultation with the relevant regional and subregional organizations, to provide logistic support both prior to and during the conference.

COMPOSITION OF UNOSOM

The authorized strength of UNOSOM is 4,219 all ranks. Currently, UNOSOM's military component has a strength of 696 all ranks. It is composed of a 500 all ranks battalion from Pakistan, 50 military observers, movement and logistics elements, a headquarters company and a headquarters staff. After the adoption of resolution 794 (1992), further deployment into Somalia was put on hold pending assessment of conditions on the ground. As the first preparatory step for accelerating the transition to UNOSOM II, the UNOSOM headquarters will shortly be strengthened by 30 military officers. Also, it has been decided to authorize the deployment of 250 additional soldiers from Pakistan to augment and enhance the flexibility of the Pakistani infantry battalion.

UNOSOM's military personnel are currently provided by the following countries: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic/Slovak Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan and Zimbabwe.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The General Assembly, by resolution 47/41 of 1 December 1992, decided to appropriate a total of approximately $110 million to finance UNOSOM for the period from 1 May 1992 to 30 April 1993. The costs of the operation are to be met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States. As at 31 January 1993, contributions outstanding to the UNOSOM Special Account amounted to approximately $81 million.

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

LOCATION: Mozambique

HEADQUARTERS: Maputo

DURATION: December 1992 - to date

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: Between 7,000 and 8,000 military and civilian personnel

INTERIM SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. Aldo Ajello (Italy)

FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Lélio Gonçalves Rodrigues da Silva (Brazil)

BACKGROUND

On 4 October 1992, after 14 years of devastating civil war, Mr. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique, and Mr. Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, President of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), signed in Rome a General Peace Agreement establishing the principles and modalities for the achievement of peace in Mozambique. The Agreement called for United Nations participation in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement, in providing technical assistance for the general elections and in monitoring these elections.

Under the Agreement, negotiated over the past two years with the help of a number of mediators and observers including United Nations representatives, a cease-fire was to come into effect not later than 15 October 1992, referred to as E-Day. The Agreement itself and its seven protocols called for the cease-fire to be followed rapidly by the separation of the two sides' forces and their concentration in certain assembly areas. Demobilization was to begin immediately thereafter of those troops who would not serve in the new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM). Demobilization would have to be completed six months after E-Day. Meanwhile, new political parties would be formed and preparations would be made for elections, scheduled to take place not later than 15 October 1993. A 16 July 1992 Declaration by the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO on guiding principles for humanitarian assistance, a Joint Declaration signed in Rome on 7 August 1992, as well as a Joint Communiqué of 10 July 1990 and an Agreement of 1 December 1990 form integral parts of the General Peace Agreement.

The United Nations was requested to undertake a major role in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement and was asked to perform specific functions in relation to the cease-fire, the elections and humanitarian assistance. The implementation of the Agreement was to be supervised by a Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) chaired by the United Nations.

On 9 October 1992, United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted to the Security Council a report on the proposed United Nations role in Mozambique, in which he recommended an immediate plan of action and stated his intention, subject to the Council's approval, to appoint an interim Special Representative to oversee the United Nations activities in that country.

On 13 October, the Security Council adopted resolution 782 (1992), by which it welcomed the signature of the General Peace Agreement between the Mozambican Government and RENAMO and approved the appointment by the Secretary-General of an interim Special Representative and the dispatch to Mozambique of a team of up to 25 military observers.

THE AGREEMENT ENTERS INTO FORCE

On the same day, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Aldo Ajello as his interim Special Representative for Mozambique, and asked him to proceed to Mozambique to assist the parties in setting up the joint monitoring machinery, in finalizing the modalities and conditions for the military arrangements and in carrying out the various other actions that were required of them at the very beginning of the peace process.

The interim Special Representative and the team of 21 military observers, drawn from existing United Nations peace-keeping missions, arrived in Mozambique on 15 October 1992, the day the General Peace Agreement entered into force. On 20 October, two teams of military observers were also deployed to Nampula and Beira. Later, two additional outposts were established to verify the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique,* which is an important element of the General Peace Agreement.

Both Mozambican parties have committed themselves to undertake, immediately after, and in some instances before, the entry into effect of the Agreement, specific action to set in motion the joint mechanisms to monitor and verify its implementation. However, no such action had been initiated at the time when the interim Special Representative arrived in Mozambique. Upon arrival, he started extensive discussions with the parties concerned in an effort to ensure the early start of implementation of the Agreement.

Meanwhile, major violations of the cease-fire were reported in various areas of the country, and the parties presented official complaints to the interim Special Representative. He urged the two parties to refrain from any type of military operation and to discuss and settle all disputes through negotiations.

The Secretary-General reported on the situation to the President of the Security Council on 23 October. The President, in a statement dated 27 October, expressed the Council's deep concern about the reports of major violations of the cease-fire, called upon the parties to halt such violations immediately and urged them to cooperate fully with the interim Special Representative.

SETTING UP OF MONITORING MECHANISM

In an attempt to avoid further escalation of hostilities, the interim Special Representative called for an early informal meeting of the Government and RENAMO. The initiative was successful, and both parties sent high-level delegations to attend their first meeting in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique. Thereafter, the two delegations met on numerous occasions, both bilaterally and together with the interim Special Representative. On 4 November 1992, the interim Special Representative appointed the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC). CSC is to guarantee the implementation of the Agreement, assume responsibility for authentic interpretation of it, settle any disputes that may arise between the parties and guide and coordinate the activities of the other Commissions. It is chaired by the United Nations and was initially composed of Government and RENAMO delegations, with representatives of Italy (the mediator State), France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States (observer States at the Rome talks), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In December, Germany also became a member of CSC.

CSC held its first meeting on 4 November and appointed the main subsidiary commissions: the Cease-fire Commission (CCF), the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel (CORE), as well as the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM), in which the United Nations does not participate.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ONUMOZ

On 3 December 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his further report, in which he presented a detailed operational plan for the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Describing the difficulties of the operation, he referred to the size of the country, the devastated state of its infrastructure, the disruption of its economy by war and drought, the limited capacity of the Government to cope with the new tasks arising from the General Peace Agreement and the complexity of the processes envisaged in the Agreement. He also referred to the breadth of responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations under the Agreement.

The Secretary-General expressed his conviction that it would not be possible to create the conditions for successful elections in Mozambique unless the military situation had been brought fully under control and that the Agreement would not be implemented unless the Mozambican parties made a determined effort in good faith to honour their commitments.

In recommending to the Security Council the establishment and deployment of ONUMOZ, the Secretary-General stated that "in the light of recent experiences elsewhere, the recommendations in the present report may be thought to invite the international community to take a risk. I believe that the risk is worth taking; but I cannot disguise that it exists."

On 16 December, the Security Council, by its resolution 797 (1992), approved the Secretary-

* As the civil war intensified, Malawi and Zimbabwe, with the agreement of the Government of Mozambique, deployed troops in the transport corridors to assist the Government's forces in keeping them open. These corridors, which run across Mozambique from the Indian Ocean to land-locked countries to the north and west, are of critical importance for southern Africa.

General's report and decided to establish ONUMOZ until 31 October 1993. The Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation that the elections not take place until the military aspects of the General Peace Agreement have been fully implemented. It called upon the Mozambican Government and RENAMO to cooperate fully with the United Nations and to respect scrupulously the cease-fire and their obligations under the Agreement.

ONUMOZ'S MANDATE

In accordance with the General Peace Agreement, the mandate of ONUMOZ includes four important elements: political, military, electoral and humanitarian. The operational concept of ONUMOZ is based on the strong interrelationship between these four components, requiring a fully integrated approach and coordination by the interim Special Representative. Without sufficient humanitarian aid, and especially food supplies, the security situation in the country may deteriorate and the demobilization process might stall. Without adequate military protection, the humanitarian aid would not reach its destination. Without sufficient progress in the political area, the confidence required for the disarmament and rehabilitation process would not exist. The electoral process, in turn, requires prompt demobilization and formation of the new armed forces, without which the conditions would not exist for successful elections.

POLITICAL ASPECTS

The Office of the interim Special Representative provides overall direction of United Nations activities in Mozambique and is responsible for political guidance of the peace process, including facilitating the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, in particular by chairing CSC and its subordinate commissions.

MILITARY ASPECTS

ONUMOZ is to monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces of the two parties, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons; to monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces, and to provide security in the four transport corridors; to monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups; to authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and to provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process.

ONUMOZ's verification of the arrangements for the cease-fire and other military aspects of the peace process in Mozambique would be carried out mainly by teams of United Nations military observers at the 49 assembly areas in three military regions and elsewhere in the field. Teams would also be deployed at airports, ports and other critical areas, including RENAMO headquarters.

The military aspects of the United Nations operation in Mozambique would be closely linked with the humanitarian effort. The approximately 110,000 soldiers who come to the assembly areas would be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into civil society. They would need food and other support as soon as the assembly areas are established. An ONUMOZ technical unit, staffed by civilian personnel, would assist in implementing the demobilization programme and would collaborate closely with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC) on the programme's humanitarian aspects.

The General Peace Agreement provides for the withdrawal of foreign troops to be initiated following the entry into force of the cease-fire. Simultaneously, CSC, through the Cease-fire Commission, would assume immediate responsibility "for verifying and ensuring security of strategic and trading routes", of which the most important are the four transport corridors. ONUMOZ would have to assume transitional responsibility for the security of the corridors in order to protect humanitarian convoys using them, pending the formation of the new unified armed forces. Bearing this in mind, ONUMOZ infantry battalions will be deployed in the corridors.

While the Agreement does not provide a specific role for United Nations civilian police in monitoring the neutrality of the Mozambican police, the Secretary-General proposed to leave open the possibility of introducing a police component into ONUMOZ, should both Mozambican parties so request.

MONITORING OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

Under the terms of the Agreement, legislative and presidential elections would be held simultaneously one year after the date of signature of the Agreement. This period may be extended if warranted by the prevailing circumstances.

ONUMOZ's Electoral Division is to monitor and verify all aspects and stages of the electoral process

which will be organized by the National Elections Commission. The Division would provide overall direction and maintain contacts with the Government of Mozambique, RENAMO, the National Elections Commission and the main political parties.

In addition, the Secretary-General's interim Special Representative would coordinate technical assistance to the whole electoral process in Mozambique, which would be provided through the United Nations Development Programme, other existing mechanisms of the United Nations system, and the bilateral channels.

HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

ONUMOZ's humanitarian component – UNOHAC – is to be established in Maputo, with suboffices at the regional and provincial levels. It would replace the present office of the United Nations Specic Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations, which had been responsible for humanitarian assistance programmes in Mozambique. Headed by the Humanitcrian Affairs Coordinator, and under the overall authority of the interim Special Representative, it would function as an integrated component of ONUMOZ. Operational agencies and the non-governmental aid community would be asked to provide representatives to work within UNOHAC.

It is estimated that, as a result of both the war and the continuing drought, the internally displaced population in Mozambique totals some 3 to 4 million people. At present, about 3 million Mozambicans living in accessible areas are receiving humanitarian assistance. The signing of the Peace Agreement has already created access to additional affected areas, many of which are controlled by RENAMO. As a consequence, nearly 270,000 additional beneficiaries are receiving humanitarian assistance from the United Nations and from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Indications are that the number of additional beneficiaries may reach 500,000 in a matter of months. It is also estimated that some 1.8 million Mozambican refugees living in neighbouring countries may return home.

UNOHAC would also make available food and other relief for distribution by a technical unit of ONUMOZ to the soldiers in the assembly areas. Subsequently, humanitarian aid would be required for the reintegration of demobilized troops into their communities.

COMPOSITION OF ONUMOZ

ONUMOZ is to number between 7,000 and 8,000 military and civilian personnel.

The Office of the interim Special Representative is to comprise up to 12 international Professional staff, 8 international support staff and an adequate number of locally recruited staff.

The military component is to include 354 military observers; five logistically self-sufficient infantry battalions, each composed of up to 850 personnel; one engineer battalion; three logistics companies; a Headquarters company; a movement control company; a communications unit; a medical unit and an air unit. So far, the following States have expressed their readiness in principle to make the necessary personnel available: Argentina, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, Czech Republic, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Italy, Malaysia, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Zambia and Uruguay.

ONUMOZ Electoral Division is to include up to 148 international electoral officers, supported by a number of United Nations Volunteers and international and local support staff. During the polling itself, the Electoral Division would require the services of up to 1,200 international observers.

UNOHAC would require 16 international Professional staff to coordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance in Mozambique; it is to be assisted by an ONUMOZ technical unit in the humanitarian aspects of the demobilization process.

In addition, the deployment of up to 28 international Professional staff, up to 100 United Nations Volunteers, up to 124 international support staff and an adequate number of local staff is envisaged to provide secretariat functions and administrative support to the military, electoral and humanitarian components of ONUMOZ, as well as to the Commissions chaired by the United Nations.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

The Secretary-General has estimated that the cost to the United Nations related to the establishment and deployment of ONUMOZ for a period of eight and a half months would be approximately $146 million. The costs of the Operation are to be met by assessed contributions from United Nations Member States.